Europe’s 2026 Heatwaves Linked to More Than 32,000 Deaths, Study Estimates
Heat-related deaths in 854 European cities reached an estimated 50,391 in summer 2026, according to a new study. Malta, Italy and Hungary recorded the highest modelled mortality rates, while a severe June heatwave accounted for nearly one-third of the estimated toll.
Rising temperatures and intense heat can pose health risks for children, particularly during prolonged heatwaves. Representational image. Image credit: Vika Glitter/ Pexels
Europe’s summer heat took an estimated 50,391 lives across 854 cities in 2026, with human-induced climate change contributing to nearly two-thirds of the heat-related deaths, according to a new study. The researchers estimate that 32,619 deaths—65% of the total—would not have occurred in the same way without the additional warming caused by human activities.
The findings point to a particularly heavy toll in southern Europe, where heat-related mortality rates were substantially higher than in the continent’s northern regions. Malta recorded the highest modelled rate, at 716 deaths per million people, followed by Italy at 561, Hungary at 537 and Croatia at 461.
The estimates cover June to August and are based on 854 cities across 30 countries, including the 27 European Union member states, the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland. These cities had a combined population of about 173 million in 2026, representing nearly 40% of the population across the countries studied. The figures therefore describe the burden in the cities covered by the research, rather than a complete count for Europe.
The scale of the estimated toll is striking against the backdrop of another exceptionally hot European summer. The Copernicus Climate Change Service ranked summer 2026 as the continent’s third warmest on record and the warmest on record in western Europe. The region’s seasonal mean temperature reached 21.69°C, which was 2.54°C above the 1991–2020 average.
Southern Europe Bears the Heaviest Mortality Burden
The study’s age-standardised estimates show a marked regional divide. Southern Europe recorded 380 heat-related excess deaths per million people, compared with 277 in western Europe, 250 in eastern Europe and 129 in northern Europe.
These rates account for differences in population age structure, making regional comparisons more meaningful. They also show why the number of deaths attributed to warming and the overall mortality rate should not be treated as interchangeable measures.
The proportion of heat-related deaths attributed to human-induced climate change was highest in Estonia and Bulgaria, at 81% in each, followed by Finland at 80%. Southern Europe’s estimated share was 69%, while northern Europe’s was 59%.
Modelled heat-related deaths across European cities rose sharply in summer 2026, reaching an estimated 50,391—the highest figure shown in the chart. The study attributes 65% of the deaths to human-induced climate change, compared with 59% in 2022 and 42% in 2003.
A high climate-attributable proportion does not necessarily mean a country had the highest heat mortality rate. The two measures answer different questions: how much heat-related mortality occurred, and how much of that burden can be attributed to human-caused warming. The researchers also caution that Malta’s estimate of the climate-attributable share carries considerable uncertainty.
Summer Heat: Deadly Fortnight in June
Nearly one-third of the estimated summer deaths occurred between June 17 and July 1, when the average daily mean temperature across the cities was 5.3°C above the 1991–2020 average. The study estimates that 57% of heat-related deaths during this period were attributable to human-induced climate change.
That share was lower than the 65% estimate for the summer as a whole. It does not mean climate change had little influence on the June heatwave. The researchers explain that the episode was so extreme that it would still have caused substantial harm even in a hypothetical climate without human-caused warming.
“I think we can be quite confident in stating that the summer of 2026 is likely to have been the worst on record for heat-related mortality across much of Europe. These numbers are a stark reminder that our hotter, more extreme summers are having an increasingly severe impact on public health. Behind these statistics are real people whose lives were lost and real families who grieve for them.
“It is yet another reminder both of the imperative of rolling out targeted interventions to protect those who are most vulnerable to this increasingly extreme heat, and of the growing need to rapidly transition away from fossil fuels to slow the pace of change and limit future warming.” said, Dr Clair Barnes, Extreme Weather and Climate Change Researcher at the Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London
The city-wide average also conceals local extremes. The study found that the average daily temperature anomaly across the cities peaked at 7.3°C above normal, while some countries experienced days with temperatures as much as 12°C above their usual levels. Western Europe recorded an average summer temperature anomaly of 2.9°C, and southern Europe 2.6°C. The analysis also estimated 1,508 additional heat-related deaths between May 21 and May 31. These are reported separately from the headline June–August total.
Older People Face the Greatest Risk
Age was a major factor in the estimated mortality burden. People aged 85 and older accounted for 22,502 heat-related excess deaths—close to 45% of the summer total. By comparison, the estimated number among people aged 20 to 44 was about 833.
The toll was not confined to older adults. The study estimates that around 6,000 heat-related excess deaths occurred among people under 65, underscoring the risk faced by working-age adults as well as older residents.
Heat exposure can become especially dangerous when high daytime temperatures persist into the night, leaving the body with less opportunity to recover. The researchers note that the June episode involved high humidity and unusually warm nights, conditions that may have contributed to the health burden and could mean the model underestimated its effects.
The figures are statistical estimates of excess mortality, not a tally of death certificates naming heat or climate change as the cause. The researchers modelled the relationship between temperature and mortality, then estimated how many deaths were associated with observed temperatures and how that burden changed when the human-caused component of warming was removed.
Toll Higher Than Previous Benchmark Summers
Using the same group of 854 cities and the same analytical framework, the researchers estimated 29,480 heat-related excess deaths in summer 2022, 28,462 in 2003 and 24,572 in 2025. The 2026 estimate of 50,391 is substantially higher than each of those figures.
The comparison matters because estimates produced using different methods, time periods or geographical coverage can give misleading impressions of how mortality has changed. Applying a consistent framework to the same cities provides a more direct comparison, although the figures remain modelled estimates. National monitoring systems have also reported large mortality burdens during the 2026 heat episodes, but their estimates cannot be directly added to or compared with the study’s total.
In France, the national public health agency estimated at least 5,764 excess deaths from all causes during the June 17–July 2 heatwave across 92 departments covering 98.5% of mainland France’s population. Around two-thirds of those deaths were among people aged 75 and older. The measure captures excess deaths during the heatwave; it does not mean every death was individually certified as heat-related.
In England, the UK Health Security Agency estimated 2,124 heat-associated deaths during the June 21–28 heatwave and another 753 during a May episode, giving an interim combined estimate of 2,877. Germany’s Robert Koch Institute estimated around 16,000 heat-related excess deaths over a longer period, from April 6 to September 6, while Spain’s mortality monitoring system reported 5,123 excess deaths for June to August. Differences in coverage, time periods and methods mean these national figures should be read in their own context.
What the Estimates Can/Cannot Tell
To estimate the effect of climate change, the researchers compared observed temperatures with a counterfactual scenario in which the human-caused component of warming was removed. They then applied age-specific relationships between temperature and mortality, drawing on mortality data from 232 European Union cities covering 2000–2019, alongside population and mortality estimates for 2026.
The approach allows researchers to estimate the contribution of human-induced warming across many cities, but it has limitations. The underlying exposure–response data may not fully reflect changes in healthcare, adaptation, health conditions or vulnerability since 2019. The model also uses daily mean temperatures and assumes vulnerability remains constant throughout the year.
The study’s findings are therefore not a direct count of deaths that can individually be assigned to climate change. They are an estimate of how much the summer’s heat-related mortality burden changed because of human-caused warming.
Even with those qualifications, the size of the estimated toll raises practical questions for cities facing increasingly severe heat. Early warnings, accessible cooling spaces, support for older people and others at higher risk, and health services prepared for heat-related illness can help reduce exposure and its consequences. Cutting greenhouse gas emissions remains essential to limiting further warming, while public-health measures can help protect people from the heat already occurring.
EP Staff is the editorial team at EdPublica, an independent media organisation focused on science, education, environment and public policy. The team produces evidence-based news, features, explainers and analysis on issues that shape society and everyday life.
What Does Changing Western Disturbances Mean for Himalayan Rainfall?
New research reveals how changes in Western Disturbances are reshaping winter precipitation across the Western Himalayas, affecting rainfall, snowfall and regional water patterns.
Changing atmospheric circulation and moisture patterns influence precipitation across the Himalayan mountain region. Representational image. Image credit: Connor Scott McManus/ Pexels
The atmospheric systems that bring winter rain and snow to the Himalayas are changing in ways that complicate a familiar assumption that more weather systems mean more precipitation.
A study published in the International Journal of Climatology in March 2026 examined winter precipitation across the Western Himalayan region over two 30-year periods, 1961–1990 and 1993–2022. Using ERA5 atmospheric reanalysis data, the researchers found that Western Disturbances and the number of days associated with them had increased, while the density of their tracks across the study region had declined as their paths shifted northward.
The study also identified a decline in large-scale precipitation. A greater proportion of the precipitation that did occur fell as rain rather than snow, partly offsetting the reduction in snowfall. These findings point to changes in the location, form and mechanisms of precipitation, rather than a uniform increase in rainfall across the Himalayas.
What are Western Disturbances?
Western Disturbances are eastward-moving weather systems that originate in the Mediterranean and adjoining regions and travel towards South Asia. They are embedded in the westerly flow of the middle and upper atmosphere and are an important source of winter precipitation over northwestern India and the western Himalayas.
When these systems reach the mountains, their effects depend on several interacting factors: the amount of moisture they carry, the strength and direction of atmospheric winds, the temperature profile of the air and the shape and elevation of the terrain.
As moist air rises over mountain slopes, it cools and water vapour condenses into cloud droplets or ice crystals. Depending on atmospheric conditions, precipitation can fall as rain or snow. The distribution of precipitation varies with the system’s track and intensity, as well as local topography. A shift in the path of a Western Disturbance can therefore change which valleys and mountain slopes receive precipitation, even if the overall number of systems increases.
Why Frequency Alone Does Not Explain the Rainfall
The 2026 study highlights an important distinction between the occurrence of Western Disturbances and the precipitation they produce. Although the researchers found an increase in the number of disturbances and associated days, their analysis showed that fewer tracks passed through the Western Himalayan study region. The northward shift was associated with a decline in large-scale precipitation.
The study also found that rising temperatures increased the atmosphere’s capacity to hold moisture, while weaker vertical winds reduced the upward movement of air. Reduced transport of moisture into the upper troposphere also affected cloud microphysical processes that support large-scale precipitation.
A southward shift in Western Disturbances and increased moisture from the Arabian Sea may contribute to intense Himalayan rainfall, highlighting the complex interaction between atmospheric circulation, ocean warming and mountain topography.
These processes help explain why a warmer atmosphere does not automatically translate into greater precipitation everywhere. Temperature, moisture availability, vertical air movement and the location of weather systems all influence how much precipitation forms and where it falls.
The findings also have implications for snowfall. When temperatures rise, a larger share of precipitation can fall as rain instead of snow, depending on conditions within the atmosphere and near the surface. Such a change can affect seasonal snow accumulation and the timing of water entering Himalayan river systems.
How Does Climate Change Fit Into the Picture?
Climate change alters the background conditions in which Western Disturbances develop and travel. Rising temperatures influence atmospheric moisture, while changes in circulation can affect the systems’ tracks and the way they interact with mountain terrain.
However, researchers have identified different trends across different parts of the wider Himalayan region. Findings from the Western Himalayas cannot automatically be applied to Nepal or the eastern Himalayas, where the influence of weather systems, topography and moisture sources may differ.
The October 11, 2026, flash flood in Nepal’s Budhi Gandaki river system illustrates why this distinction matters. According to the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), a preliminary assessment suggested that a landslide may have blocked the river before the temporary barrier failed, releasing water, sediment and debris downstream. The organisation said further investigation was needed to establish the event’s precise trigger.
The flood, therefore, cannot be attributed to a change in Western Disturbances on the available evidence. The scientific questions surrounding the event include the mechanics of the landslide, the temporary river blockage and the release of the accumulated water. Establishing whether weather conditions contributed to the initial slope failure requires separate evidence.
What Scientists Need to Examine Next
Understanding changes in Himalayan precipitation requires researchers to look beyond the number of Western Disturbances recorded in a season. Their tracks, intensity, moisture transport, vertical wind patterns and the proportion of rain and snow all need to be examined together.
Long-term observations and atmospheric reanalysis can help identify regional trends, while measurements of snow cover, precipitation and mountain hydrology can show how those changes affect water availability. Comparisons across the western, central and eastern Himalayas are also necessary to establish where trends are consistent and where they differ.
The central finding is that changes in atmospheric circulation can redistribute precipitation even as the climate warms. For the Himalayas, where snow accumulation, river flow and mountain ecosystems depend on the timing and form of precipitation, understanding these regional differences is essential to explaining how the water cycle is changing.
Istanbul Floods Reveal How Climate Change and Urbanisation Combine to Raise Flood Risks
Urban flooding highlights the growing challenges cities face in managing extreme rainfall, protecting vulnerable communities and strengthening climate resilience.
Flooded streets disrupt daily life and expose communities to the risks posed by inadequate drainage and extreme rainfall. Representational image .Image credit: Misbahul Aulia/Unsplash
The torrential rainfall that flooded Istanbul on October 14–15 has highlighted a growing challenge for cities confronting extreme weather: how to prepare for heavier rainfall when the extent of climate change’s influence varies across regions, and the damage depends partly on how urban landscapes are built.
A new analysis by the ClimaMeter research team finds that weather patterns similar to those behind the floods now bring about 7% heavier rainfall and 9% stronger winds than comparable patterns recorded between 1950 and 1987. Temperatures in the region of heaviest rainfall are up to 1.5°C higher than in the historical comparison period.
However, the increase in rainfall was not statistically significant over Istanbul itself. The researchers identified significant rainfall increases across parts of western and north-western Anatolia and along the Black Sea coast north of the city, while natural climate variability also contributed to the event.
The floods triggered 1,277 flooding incidents and 15 landslides across Istanbul, according to the analysis. ClimaMeter reported 194 millimetres of rainfall at Ömerli in the Beykoz district, while Istanbul’s disaster coordination centre, AKOM, reported 277.1 millimetres in Beykoz during the event. Two people died, 595 people were evacuated after becoming trapped, and roads and schools were affected.
The findings underline an important distinction: climate change can alter the conditions associated with extreme rainfall, but it does not explain every aspect of an individual flood. Urban drainage, land use and exposure determine how rainfall translates into damage.
What climate attribution reveals
The ClimaMeter analysis compared the atmospheric conditions of October 14–15, 2026, with similar weather patterns from 1950–1987 and 1988–2025. Using the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts’ ERA5 reanalysis data, researchers examined changes in precipitation, temperature and wind.
They estimated that about 3% of the rain-linked damage associated with the event was attributable to human-driven climate change, with an estimated range of 1–4%. This is a rainfall-based attribution estimate, not a calculation of the proportion of all damage caused by global warming. The methodology does not account for drainage capacity, impermeable surfaces or construction along streambeds.
The physical basis for heavier rainfall is well established. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) explains that the atmosphere can hold approximately 7% more water vapour for every 1°C of warming. When atmospheric conditions are favourable, additional moisture can contribute to more intense precipitation.
The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report concludes that heavy precipitation has become more frequent and intense across most land regions with sufficient observational coverage, primarily because of human influence. Regional trends, however, are not uniform, and Mediterranean precipitation patterns are affected by considerable natural variability.
The Istanbul findings therefore point to a need for preparedness without overstating the evidence. The absence of a statistically significant local rainfall trend does not mean the city faces no climate risk. It means that the specific analysis did not establish a significant rainfall increase over Istanbul for the weather pattern examined.
Urban development can magnify flood damage
How a city responds to rainfall depends on more than the volume of water falling from the sky. Roads, buildings and other impermeable surfaces reduce the amount of water absorbed into the ground, increasing runoff. If drainage systems cannot carry away the additional water, streets and low-lying areas can flood rapidly.
Research conducted in Istanbul provides evidence of how planning decisions can influence this risk. A 2021 study by Seda Ertan and Rahmi Nurhan Çelik, published in Sustainability, modelled flood scenarios across a 1,653-hectare catchment of the Kağıthane Stream.
Representational image.image credit:Pexels
The researchers examined measures including green roofs, permeable road surfaces, rainwater collection and drainage channels. Their results indicated that green infrastructure could reduce surface runoff and peak flow rates, as well as the area inundated and the number of structures exposed to flood risk.
The findings suggest that flood management should extend beyond expanding conventional drainage infrastructure. Permeable surfaces can allow more rainwater to enter the ground, while green roofs and rainwater collection systems can help retain water before it reaches drainage networks. Their effectiveness nevertheless depends on local conditions and the intensity of rainfall.
A separate study published in the Journal of Flood Risk Management in January 2025 examined flood exposure and vulnerability in Istanbul’s Pendik district. The researchers found that flood-prone areas were associated with lower land values and greater concentrations of socially disadvantaged residents, including older people, refugees and people with lower levels of education.
The study identified substantial differences in vulnerability within the district. About 21% of the assessed Kaynarca basin fell into the study’s very-high-vulnerability category, while 20.4% was classified as high vulnerability. These classifications reflect the study’s specific assessment framework and should not be interpreted as estimates for Istanbul as a whole.
The research highlights an important dimension of urban resilience: communities do not experience flood risk equally. Housing conditions, access to resources, the location of residential areas and the ability to respond to warnings can influence how severely households are affected.
Building resilience beyond emergency response
The implications extend beyond Istanbul. Cities facing intense rainfall need to combine reliable drainage systems with land-use planning, early-warning mechanisms and protection of natural waterways.
Nature-based approaches can complement conventional flood defences. A 2024 review published in npj Urban Sustainability examined the role of nature-based solutions in flood-risk management, emphasising the importance of considering social and ecological outcomes alongside physical protection. Wetland restoration, urban green spaces and restored stream corridors can help retain water and reduce runoff, although they cannot eliminate the risk of flooding during extreme events.
For Istanbul, the findings also raise questions about development near waterways and the preservation of natural drainage routes. A recent report by the Turkish news agency Anadolu Agency, published on October 20, quoted Istanbul Technical University disaster-management researcher Ömer Ekmekcioğlu warning that heavily urbanised catchments and areas where natural drainage systems have been altered require particular attention.
The ClimaMeter team estimated that approximately 14.6 million people and US$558 billion in economic activity were exposed within the wider rainfall-hazard area. These figures represent exposure to the identified hazard, not the number of people directly affected or the economic losses incurred during the floods.
The broader lesson is that climate attribution and urban planning answer different but connected questions. Climate science helps establish how warming may change the intensity of weather hazards; urban-risk research examines why certain places and communities suffer greater consequences.
Istanbul’s floods demonstrate why both are necessary. Preparing for a changing climate requires understanding the rainfall, but reducing the damage also depends on where cities build, how they manage water and whether their infrastructure protects the people most exposed to risk.
Nepal’s 4.7 Billion Flood Recovery Bill Dwarfs UN Climate Fund Allocation
Nepal faces more than 4.7 billion dollars in flood recovery costs, while the UN climate damages fund has provisionally set aside 21.6 million dollars for assistance.
Flooding disrupts daily life for vulnerable communities, underscoring the need for adequate funding to support recovery after climate-related disasters. Representational image. Image credit: Kuntal Biswas/ Pexels
Nepal estimates that recovering from the devastating August floods will cost at least $4.71 billion. The United Nations’ Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage has provisionally set aside 21.6 million dollars in response, an allocation that covers only a small portion of the country’s estimated climate damages fund requirements. This highlights the climate justice gap between the scale of losses vulnerable countries face and the international support available to rebuild.
The fund’s board approved the decision at an extraordinary meeting on October 22, 2026. Of the amount set aside, $20 million is intended for potential assistance to Nepal, while $1.6 million is earmarked for oversight costs. Nepal must still complete the funding request and project approval process before the money can be disbursed. The decision is the fund’s first country-specific emergency response. Its immediate value will depend on how quickly the proposed assistance can be converted into funding for recovery work.
Reconstruction Costs Put Pressure on Nepal’s Finances
The August floods affected communities along the Bhotekoshi–Trishuli river system and damaged infrastructure in the affected region. Nepal’s estimated recovery requirements include the costs of rebuilding damaged assets and restoring services disrupted by the disaster.
For the government, reconstruction creates demands beyond the immediate response. Roads, bridges and other public infrastructure need repairs, while affected households face the expense of restoring homes and livelihoods. These costs compete with existing public spending priorities, making external assistance important to the recovery effort.
The provisional $20 million allocation for Nepal is less than 0.5% of its estimated reconstruction requirements. The funding can contribute to selected needs, but the country will have to secure substantially more money to meet the overall bill.
Climate Damages Fund to Address Climate-related Losses
The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was established under the UN climate process at COP27 in 2022 and operationalised at COP28 in 2023. It was created to help vulnerable developing countries deal with the consequences of climate change that cannot be adequately addressed through adaptation alone.
A worker arranges national flags at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) venue in Expo City Dubai, UAE. Image Credit: Kiara Worth/ UN Climate Change
These consequences include damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, as well as losses that are harder to value financially, such as harm to cultural heritage and ecosystems. The fund is intended to provide a dedicated channel for addressing such impacts. Nepal’s allocation puts that mandate into practice. However, a decision to reserve funds is only one stage in the process. The country must submit its proposal, and the relevant procedures must be completed before the allocation becomes money available for recovery projects.
The board has agreed to consider an exceptional route for Nepal’s request outside the fund’s regular application cycle. This could help avoid some of the delays associated with a standard funding round, although the actual disbursement timeline remains crucial.
International Demand Exceeds the Fund’s Resources
The funding gap is not unique to Nepal. According to figures reported in the October 2026 news report supplied for this article, the fund had received 176 requests from 119 countries, worth approximately $2.8 billion. Pledges amounted to around $822 million.
The disparity raises questions about the fund’s capacity to respond to multiple emergencies and other loss and damage needs. Even where a request qualifies for consideration, the resources available may not match the amount sought.
The Nepal decision also illustrates why the terms used in climate finance announcements matter. A pledge is a commitment to provide money; an allocation sets aside funds for a specified purpose; a disbursement means the money has actually been transferred. For communities awaiting assistance, the final stage is the one that enables work to begin.
What Happens Next?
Nepal’s recovery will require financing from several sources, as the UN fund’s allocation is far below the estimated reconstruction bill. The immediate task is to complete the procedures required to access the proposed funding and identify the projects it will support.
The fund will also need to demonstrate that its emergency process can deliver assistance without creating unnecessary delays. Its ability to mobilise additional contributions will determine how much support it can offer as requests accumulate.
Nepal’s case provides an early measure of the distance between the scale of climate-related damage and the financial resources currently available through this mechanism. The provisional allocation is a concrete step, but its contribution to recovery will become clear only when the money reaches the projects and communities for which it is intended.