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India Captures 5.7% of Global Greenfield Investment, Outpacing China

India accounted for 5.7% of global greenfield investment between 2020 and 2025, more than double China’s share. UNCTAD data highlight the concentration of investment in AI infrastructure, semiconductors and energy-transition technologies.

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Greenfield investment: Solar Farm and Global Greenfield Investment
Energy-transition technologies accounted for 7.8% of global greenfield investment between 2020 and 2025, according to UNCTAD data. Representational image. Image credit: Charl Durand/ Pexels

India accounted for 5.7% of global greenfield investment between 2020 and 2025, more than twice China’s 2.8% share, even as investment in strategically important industries remained concentrated in Europe and North America. The figures highlight India’s position as a major destination for new investment while exposing the wider challenge facing developing economies seeking a larger role in emerging technology and energy supply chains.

The findings, reported in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s latest investment analysis, come amid a shift in global capital towards artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, semiconductors and energy-transition technologies. These sectors accounted for 44% of global greenfield investment in 2025, compared with 16% in 2020. UNCTAD’s July 2026 analysis identifies the shift as a significant change in the direction of international investment.

India Leads Among the Listed Asian Economies

India accounted for the largest share of global greenfield investment among the Asian economies listed in the report, followed by Malaysia at 4%, Indonesia at 3.8% and China at 2.8%.

Greenfield investment involves establishing new operations in another country, such as a factory, data centre or manufacturing facility. Unlike an acquisition, which transfers ownership of an existing business, a greenfield project can create new productive capacity, although its effects on jobs, domestic suppliers and technology transfer depend on how the project is developed.

India’s 5.7% share is therefore a measure of its participation in new investment projects, rather than a direct measure of jobs created, technology acquired or investment actually realised. Announced project values and completed investments can differ.

AI Infrastructure Attracts the Largest Share

The changing composition of investment is as significant as its geographical distribution. According to the figures cited in the report, global greenfield investment totalled $845.7 billion over 2020–2025. AI infrastructure and related technologies attracted the largest share, at 12.4%, followed by the semiconductor value chain at 8.1% and energy-transition technologies and services at 7.8%.

The shift reflects the capital requirements of the digital economy, from data centres and computing infrastructure to the chips that power AI systems. Energy-transition technologies represent another strategically important area as economies invest in technologies and services associated with changing energy systems.

These industries can shape future manufacturing capacity, technology development and supply-chain relationships. Attracting investment into them can offer host countries opportunities to build industrial capabilities, but the benefits depend on whether domestic businesses, workers and research institutions become part of the value chain.

Europe and North America Retain Their Advantage

Despite the growing participation of Asian economies, strategic investment remains concentrated in a limited number of regions. Europe accounted for 28.4% of strategic investment during 2020–2025, while North America captured another 28%, according to the reported figures. Developing Asia accounted for 26.5% among developing economies, with China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore identified as leading destinations for new investment.

The distribution points to an important distinction: a country can attract a substantial share of new investment without having equal access to the industries commanding the greatest strategic importance. Strategic projects often require substantial capital, reliable energy and digital infrastructure, specialised skills and established supplier networks. Economies with these capabilities can offer investors advantages that are difficult for less industrialised countries to replicate quickly.

For developing countries, the challenge is not simply to attract foreign capital, but to secure investment in activities that strengthen domestic productive capacity and connect local businesses to international supply chains.

Industrial Policy Shapes Investment Competition

India’s record of industrial policymaking provides another part of the picture. The report’s figures show that India implemented 1,416 industrial policies between 2008 and 2021, compared with 4,201 in China and 4,025 in the United States. The figures place India among the countries that have used industrial policy extensively over the period.

Industrial policies can include incentives, subsidies, domestic manufacturing programmes and measures intended to develop particular industries. Governments use them to influence where companies invest, which technologies are developed and how domestic producers participate in global markets.

However, the number of policies alone does not establish their effectiveness. Their impact depends on implementation, the industries targeted, the resources committed and whether the measures lead to lasting improvements in productivity, technological capability and employment.

Wider Challenge for the Global South

UNCTAD’s central concern is that the shift towards strategic industries could deepen existing investment inequalities. Its July 2026 analysis found that low-income and lower-middle-income economies attracted only about 10% of global greenfield investment in strategic sectors between 2020 and 2025, compared with more than 20% in other sectors. The gap suggests that the industries attracting increasing amounts of capital are not necessarily opening opportunities evenly across the developing world.

For India, the 5.7% share offers evidence of its place in the global investment landscape. The next question is how effectively the country can translate new projects into stronger domestic supply chains, skilled employment and technological capacity, particularly in sectors such as semiconductors, AI infrastructure and energy-transition technologies.

For other developing economies, the concentration of investment presents a more fundamental concern: without the infrastructure, financing and skills required to compete, they risk remaining on the margins of industries that will shape future production and trade.

The distribution of greenfield investment will therefore matter beyond headline investment shares. It will help determine which economies build the productive capabilities needed to participate in the next phase of industrial development.

Energy

Can India’s Electric Vehicles, Efficient ACs and LEDs Show How Policy Can Change Energy Use?

India’s shift to efficient ACs, electric three-wheelers and LED bulbs shows how policy can change everyday energy choices. A new RMI report examines what these changes mean for the country’s electricity demand, fuel dependence and energy security.

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Cars pass India Gate in New Delhi, illuminated in the colours of the Indian national flag, at dusk.
Traffic passes India Gate in New Delhi. Electric three-wheelers are among the transport segments where India has seen growing adoption of electric vehicles, according to the RMI report. Representational image. Image credit: Belal Ahmed Siddiqui/ Pexels

Three out of every five three-wheelers sold in India are now electric. A decade ago, inverter air conditioners accounted for barely 1% of the market; but by 2022, their share had reached 77%. The UJALA programme, meanwhile, has distributed 369 million LED bulbs to households across the country. These efforts have become a part of India’s transition towards energy efficiency which receives less attention than solar parks and power plants. The primary underlying factor behind the movement is the fact that the way people use energy, and the policies that influence what they buy drives to the ultimate transition.

A report by the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI), Locking in Prosperity: Ten Practical, Evidence-Backed Actions Toward Affordable, Reliable, and Secure Power Systems, uses these Indian examples to show how countries can make electricity more affordable and reduce their dependence on fuels whose prices can change suddenly. It uses examples from India and other countries to explain what governments, power companies and regulators can do. The report examines 20 case studies across 15 countries and recommends ten actions to improve electricity systems.

The two of its recommendations featuring India are improving the efficiency of air conditioning and encouraging electric vehicle adoption. Its UJALA programme appears separately as an example of how large-scale procurement can bring down the cost of efficient technology. The common thread is practical policy, while each example shows how government intervention can help shift a market, reduce costs for consumers or ease pressure on the energy system.

Inverter ACs Move From the Margins to the Mainstream

India’s air-conditioning market offers a striking example of how quickly consumer technology changes when efficiency is set as a market priority. According to figures cited in Press Information Bureau, inverter ACs made up just 1% of the market in 2015. Their share rose steadily over the following years, reaching 30% in 2017, 54% in 2018 and 77% in 2022.

Inverter technology adjusts a compressor’s speed to match cooling demand. Conventional fixed-speed units generally switch the compressor on and off to maintain the set temperature. The ability to vary output allows inverter models to use electricity more efficiently under many operating conditions. RMI attributes the market shift to India’s efforts to promote cooling efficiency through standards, product labelling and wider awareness. Its recommendation is to strengthen testing and labelling so that consumers can identify air conditioners that perform efficiently under real-world conditions.

Energy efficiency: chart visualization

The effect is also seen in the country’s overall electricity demand. The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects India’s electricity use to grow by an average of 6.4% a year until 2030. Air conditioning is expected to account for more than one-fifth of that increase.

As temperatures rise and more households install ACs, the electricity consumed by each unit will affect the country’s total demand. ACs that use less power can reduce the amount of additional electricity needed. But India will still have to expand its power generation capacity and upgrade the networks that carry electricity to homes and businesses.

Electric Three-wheelers Changing the Economics of Transport

India’s electric three-wheeler market sets another example of policy and economics reinforcing each other. RMI describes India as a global leader in the electrification of two- and three-wheelers as electric vehicles account for three in five three-wheelers sold in the country today. Adoption of electric two-wheelers is also increasing. The major reason for the shift has been purchase incentives, domestic manufacturing measures and the expansion of charging infrastructure. But the financial case for drivers is just as important.

For a commercial three-wheeler covering long distances each day, fuel is a recurring expense. An electric vehicle changes that cost structure: the purchase price may be higher, but the owner can spend less on energy and maintenance over the vehicle’s lifetime.

RMI compares electric and petrol-powered two- and three-wheelers based on a daily distance of 100 km. It counts the purchase price, registration, taxes, insurance, maintenance and the cost of fuel or electricity. The comparison assumes high daily use. Drivers who cover long distances can save more on running costs, helping them recover the higher purchase price of an electric vehicle. Therefore, the report recommends easier access to loans and charging facilities. It also says buyers need clear information about the total cost of owning an electric vehicle. Purchase subsidies can bring down the upfront cost, while affordable loans and dependable charging can make the switch easier for drivers.

Electric vehicles also reduce the amount of petrol and diesel needed for transport. Their growing use will increase electricity demand, but to test whether it can remain sustainable will depend partly on how that electricity is produced. For drivers, however, using electricity instead of petrol or diesel can reduce their exposure to changes in fuel prices.

UJALA: Power of Buying at Scale

Unnat Jyoti by Affordable LEDs for All is a Government of India scheme launched on January 5, 2015, to make energy-efficient LED bulbs affordable for households. Under the scheme, the government, through Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL), arranged the bulk purchase of LED bulbs and made them available to households at lower prices. LED bulbs cost more than ordinary bulbs at the time, which discouraged many households from buying them. By purchasing large quantities, EESL helped bring down prices and encouraged people to replace traditional bulbs with LEDs. This also helped households reduce electricity consumption and bills.

Under the UJALA scheme, 369 million LED bulbs have been distributed to 90 million households, according to the RMI report. Bulk procurement brought the average procurement price down by nearly 90%, from around 5 USD per bulb at the program’s launch to about 0 USD by 2024 in the report’s chart. RMI estimates that efficient LED lighting in India now saves households more than 2.24 billion dollars in electricity bills annually. This is the report’s estimate of annual savings, rather than a direct measurement of the amount saved by every household.

UJALA shows how buying products in large quantities can bring down their prices. By purchasing millions of LED bulbs together, the government helped reduce costs and made them affordable for more households. The same method could help make other energy-efficient technologies cheaper. However, bulk purchasing alone may not be enough. The products must meet quality standards, reach consumers through proper distribution networks and be easy for people to buy and use.

The Pressure Shifts to the Electricity System

The three examples show how policy can reduce the amount of energy consumers need for everyday activities and make alternatives to fossil fuels more attractive. The challenge that needs the utmost attention is how electricity demand is rising as transport, cooling, industry and digital infrastructure become more dependent on power.

The IEA expects India to add more than 570 terawatt-hours to its annual electricity consumption by 2030 compared with current levels. Along with new power plants, electricity must also be moved through transmission and distribution networks and supplied at the time and place it is needed.

This is where the other recommendations in RMI’s report become relevant. They include improving electricity-demand forecasts, clearing delays in grid connection queues, making large electricity users more flexible and using battery storage to balance supply and demand. The report also highlights advanced transmission technologies that can increase the capacity of existing lines.

These measures address a different part of the problem from efficient appliances and electric vehicles. They focus on whether the grid can handle changing patterns of electricity use without making power more expensive or less reliable. India’s experience with inverter ACs, electric three-wheelers and LED bulbs shows how government policies can influence what people buy and use. The next task is to apply similar measures across the power sector. India will need to produce electricity more cleanly, reduce wastage and expand its power networks to meet rising demand.

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Energy

Energy Independent by 2047? India’s Electricity Is Getting There. Its Oil and Gas Aren’t.

IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2026 shows India’s power sector going non-fossil fast — but oil, gas and LPG imports are set to rise, not fall, by 2035.

Dipin Damodharan

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energy independence
India’s electricity is shifting fast to non-fossil sources — but oil, gas and LPG imports are set to rise, not fall, under the IEA’s projections to 2035. Illustration: EdPublica

IEA’sWorld Energy Outlook 2026 has India’s electricity shifting fast towards non-fossil sources. For oil, gas and cooking fuel, the same projections show more imports, not fewer.

India has said since 2021 that it wants to be energy independent by 2047. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2026, published on 19 November, does not say India is on course for that. Its projections stop at 2035, and for oil and gas they point the other way.

India already meets about 40 per cent of its energy needs through imports, including 90 per cent of its crude oil and 50 per cent of its natural gas, according to the Outlook. Over the next decade its energy demand is projected to grow by 2.5 per cent a year in the agency’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), roughly three times the global rate. STEPS counts existing policies plus measures that governments have formally proposed. “In all our scenarios, India accounts for more growth in energy demand over the next decade than any other country or region in the world,” the IEA said.

The picture is uneven. Electricity is moving quickly away from imported fuel. Oil and LPG are not. And the one scenario in the Outlook where India pushes harder on imports shows gains that are real but partial.

Is India Really Heading Toward Energy Independence?

India’s electricity generation rises from 2,114 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2025 to 3,585 TWh in 2035 under STEPS, an increase of about 70 per cent. The non-fossil share, meaning renewables and nuclear, goes from 28 per cent to 51 per cent. “As non-fossil capacity continues to expand, India generates well over half of its electricity from non-fossil sources by 2035 in the STEPS,” the report says. Solar PV accounted for half of India’s capacity additions over the past decade.

energy independence
Illustration: EdPublica

A quick calculation with those rounded shares adds a wrinkle. Non-fossil output roughly triples, from about 590 TWh to about 1,830 TWh. But fossil generation, 72 per cent of the 2025 total and 49 per cent of the 2035 total, still rises from about 1,520 TWh to about 1,760 TWh, an increase of around 15 per cent. The share of coal and gas falls while the amount of electricity made from them goes up. (These are our own calculations from rounded IEA shares, not figures the IEA publishes.)

Globally, Ben Backwell, chair of the Global Renewables Alliance, pointed to the IEA’s expectation that “Renewables are now expected to grow from 33% of electricity generation today to around 50%, and potentially even higher, by 2035.” India’s non-fossil share, which includes nuclear, goes from 28 to 51 per cent over the same years. The measures differ, but the direction and rough scale are similar.

Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, reads the Hormuz crisis as an accelerant. “Hormuz will speed up electrification and renewables, likely faster than many people think,” he said. The IEA’s own summary lists a push for faster electrification among the common responses it sees from countries hit by the crisis.

Oil and LPG: the other direction

Domestic crude production is projected to fall by nearly 20 per cent by 2035 under STEPS. Over the same period refining capacity grows by about 1 million barrels a day from nearly 6 million in 2025, with another 840,000 barrels a day already under construction, 660,000 of it expansions at existing plants and 180,000 greenfield. India ranks fourth in the world by refining capacity and third by refinery runs, and it remains a net exporter of petroleum products. But a larger refining industry fed by a shrinking home supply means more crude has to come from abroad.

The Outlook expects crude imports from the Middle East to stay broadly flat while total imports rise, with most of the extra supply coming from outside the Gulf. West Asia supplied roughly half of India’s refinery intake in 2025.

Cooking gas is the sharper problem. India produced about 450,000 barrels a day of LPG in 2025, around 40 per cent of what it uses. Under STEPS, domestic supply grows by less than 100,000 barrels a day by 2035 while demand grows by nearly 400,000, which could take LPG imports to nearly 1 million barrels a day.

This year showed what that exposure costs. The IEA estimates that the LPG used in half of India’s residential cooking cylinders passes through the Strait of Hormuz. LPG imports fell by more than 50 per cent in the first two months of the conflict, and the government maximised domestic production and put household supplies ahead of other users. “The Strait of Hormuz remains critical to India’s energy security,” the report said.

IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol put the wider lesson plainly. “I don’t see any credible pathway for the energy world to return to the way it was before,” he said. He also warned that “In pursuit of greater energy security, countries must take care not to replace one dependency with another.”

What a harder push would buy

The Outlook includes a scenario in which India goes further to cut its reliance on imported fuel: faster adoption of electric vehicles, more industrial electrification, better efficiency, more renewables and more domestic coal. By 2035 electric car adoption is 30 per cent faster than under STEPS. India’s oil requirement is 580,000 barrels a day lower and its natural gas use is 8 per cent lower than in STEPS.

For scale, Jan Rosenow, Professor of Energy and Climate Policy at the University of Oxford, noted that “China’s electric vehicle fleet, for example, is avoiding around 1.5 million barrels of oil a day.” The baselines differ, since that is China’s fleet today and India’s figure is an extra saving in 2035, but it gives a sense of the size of the prize. Rosenow’s broader point was that “countries which had electrified more of their energy use were better protected from this year’s supply shock.”

Coal does much of the work on the import side. Greater domestic coal production could bring steam coal imports down from nearly 150 million tonnes of coal equivalent in 2025 to around 30 million by 2035, and cut overall coal import dependence from about 30 per cent to 15 per cent. But rising steel output pushes coking coal demand up by 55 per cent, and India would still depend on imports for much of that extra requirement.

That sits awkwardly with climate goals, and campaigners have said so. David Tong of Oil Change International said the IEA “has yet again reiterated that there is no room for new oil, gas, and coal beyond existing fields to limit global warming to 1.5ºC.” Maria Pastukhova of E3G made a different point about the global picture: “over three quarters of the additional reduction in oil and gas imports that could result from policy responses to the Hormuz crisis comes from energy efficiency, electrification and renewables.” That is a worldwide figure, not an Indian one.

The cooling load

Over the next decade India is expected to add more than 12,000 cars to its roads every day, see a 33 per cent increase in built-up space and install another 200 million air conditioners. Globally, the IEA finds that energy needed to keep buildings cool is now overtaking the energy needed to heat them for the first time.

Pastukhova called this one of the report’s most alarming and least noticed findings: “by 2035, cooling will account for 30% of global peak electricity demand.” She added that “In emerging and developing economies outside China, 85% of households are exposed to high temperatures, yet fewer than one in five of these households have air conditioning.” India is in that group. Her warning on the fix was blunt: “Falling clean technology costs alone will not prevent it”.

Air conditioning is what drives peak demand, and the Outlook says coal will keep an important role in meeting India’s electricity demand. Anyone judging how independent India’s power system can become by 2047 has to count that load.

Reading 2047 against the data

The 2047 goal was announced by the Prime Minister in his 2021 Independence Day speech, with the stated aim of bolstering energy security by reducing imports. The IEA’s own policies database lists it as announced. The Outlook does not test it directly, because its projections end in 2035.

The case that it can be done comes from elsewhere. A 2023 modelling study from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory set out a pathway to near-complete energy independence by 2047 across power, transport and industry, mainly by cutting imported oil used in road transport and imported coal used in industry and power.

Set against the IEA’s numbers, the power half of that pathway is visibly under way. The oil half is not yet there. Under STEPS, crude output falls, refining grows and LPG imports climb. The stronger scenario narrows the gap but does not close it, and it leans on coal to do so.

Birol said that “energy security and energy transitions have never been so closely aligned.” For India, the next decade will show whether that alignment reaches the fuels it buys from abroad, or stays mostly in the power grid.

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Energy

India’s Clean-Energy Transition: Will It Replace Oil Dependence With Mineral Dependence?

India’s shift towards electric vehicles, renewable energy and green hydrogen could reduce its dependence on imported fossil fuels. But with critical minerals, battery materials and clean-energy components sourced from global supply chains, a new question emerges: will the transition bring energy independence or create another form of import dependence?

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A worker operates stone-crushing machinery at an industrial mineral processing site.
A worker monitors stone-crushing equipment at a mineral processing facility. Representational image. Image credit: Rohan Batra/ Pexels

India’s dependence on imported oil is often felt far beyond the fuel market. A disruption in a major shipping route, a conflict in an oil-producing region or a sudden rise in crude prices can affect the rupee, transport costs and household budgets. The search for alternative clean energy has therefore become as much an economic concern as an environmental one.

Electric vehicles, solar power, battery storage and green hydrogen are central to that search. They promise to reduce the amount of fossil fuel India needs to buy from abroad. But there is another side to this transition: the minerals, components and technologies required to build a clean-energy economy are also tied to international supply chains.

India could end up buying less oil while remaining dependent on other countries for the materials and equipment needed to power its future. A report released by Climate Compatible Futures, Decoupling from Fossil Fuel Imports: An Accelerated Electrification Scenario for India, argues that a faster shift towards electricity, green hydrogen and bioenergy could substantially reduce the country’s fossil-fuel import bill. Under its accelerated scenario, the annual bill could fall to 7.4 lakh crore rupees by FY2035, compared with 17 lakh crore rupees under a business-as-usual pathway. The report projects that direct fossil-fuel imports could reach zero by FY2045. The figures are striking. But where will India source the materials and technologies that make this shift possible?

Minerals Behind the Energy Transition

An electric vehicle may not need petrol, but its battery needs minerals. Solar panels and wind turbines require specialised materials, while expanding electricity networks calls for large quantities of metals such as copper. Battery storage, which will become increasingly important as renewable electricity grows, adds another layer of demand.

Lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite are among the materials used in battery supply chains. India remains heavily exposed to overseas supplies for several of them. NITI Aayog’s Trade Watch report for April–June FY2026-27, published in September 2026, identifies lithium, cobalt and nickel as minerals for which India is entirely dependent on imports. Its assessment also puts import dependence for graphite at 28 per cent. The report notes that India’s copper imports rose to 11.8 billion rupees in 2025, reflecting growing demand from infrastructure, automobiles, renewable energy and manufacturing.

The dependence is not merely theoretical. In a written reply to the Lok Sabha in February 2026, the Ministry of Mines reported that India imported 2,997.1 tonnes of lithium, 2,425.6 tonnes of cobalt and 13,006 tonnes of rare earth elements in FY2024-25. The listed suppliers included China, Chile, Argentina, Belgium and Canada, among others.

These materials are not interchangeable with crude oil, and their supply chains operate differently. But their concentration in a limited number of producing and processing countries creates vulnerabilities of its own. A shortage, export restriction or geopolitical dispute can affect the cost and availability of components used by Indian manufacturers.

The International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 found that the three largest refining countries accounted for an average 86 per cent of refining across key energy minerals in 2024, up from around 82 per cent in 2020. China was the leading source of growth in refined cobalt, graphite and rare earths, while Indonesia led in nickel. The IEA also warned that diversification of refining supply chains was likely to be slow.

The concern, therefore, is not simply whether India can find mineral deposits. It is whether it can build the capacity to process them, manufacture battery materials and produce the components required by its growing clean-energy industries.

Manufacturing Capacity is not the Same as Self-Reliance

India’s solar industry illustrates the distinction between expanding domestic manufacturing and becoming independent of imports. The government told the Lok Sabha in August 2025 that the country had around 100 GW of solar photovoltaic module manufacturing capacity on the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers. Yet India imported solar modules worth approximately 1.7 billion dollars from China in FY2024-25, according to the same parliamentary reply.

The two figures do not necessarily contradict each other. Manufacturing capacity does not mean every component in the production chain is made domestically, nor does it mean imports immediately disappear. But they show why headline manufacturing capacity alone cannot establish that a supply chain is self-reliant.

The battery industry faces a similar challenge. Having facilities to assemble battery packs is not the same as controlling the production of cells, cathode and anode materials, or the processing of the minerals that go into them. A country can manufacture the final product while remaining dependent on imported inputs. This is particularly important as India expands electric mobility and renewable power. If domestic factories rely heavily on imported materials and intermediate components, global supply disruptions could still affect production costs and the pace of deployment.

Strategy is Taking Shape, But the Gap Remains.

The government has begun addressing the problem. The National Critical Mineral Mission, approved in January 2025, provides a framework for strengthening domestic exploration, overseas mineral acquisition, processing and recycling.

In its February 2026 reply to Parliament, the Ministry of Mines said that Khanij Bidesh India Limited had secured exclusive exploration and development rights for five lithium brine blocks covering around 15,702 hectares in Argentina’s Catamarca province. The first phase of non-invasive exploration had been completed. The government also reported that 46 critical and strategic mineral blocks had been auctioned, alongside seven blocks under the exploration-licence regime.

Recycling is another part of the response. The government has approved a 1,500-crore rupees incentive scheme to promote critical-mineral recycling, with a stated mission target of recycling 400 kilotonnes of material between FY2024-25 and FY2030-31. Recovering minerals from used batteries and industrial waste could provide an additional source of materials, although it will take time to build collection, processing and recycling capacity at scale. These initiatives are important, but exploration rights are not the same as producing mines, and mining alone will not create a complete domestic supply chain. Processing, refining, component manufacturing, research and recycling all require investment, technical expertise and time.

Real Test of Energy Independence

The Climate Compatible Futures report recognises that electrification requires more than replacing petrol and coal with electricity. It recommends using potential import savings to strengthen domestic manufacturing in batteries, electrolysers, power electronics and grid technology. It also points to the need for transmission infrastructure and storage to support rising electricity demand.

The scale of the proposed shift is considerable. The report estimates that producing green hydrogen in its accelerated pathway would require an additional 2,726 billion units of electricity by FY2045. This makes the availability of clean power and the equipment needed to generate, transmit and store it central to the transition. The report’s projections are a planning scenario, not a forecast, and its zero-import claim refers to direct fossil-fuel imports rather than the elimination of all fossil-fuel use.

For Dr Manish Ram, director of Climate Compatible Futures, the economic stakes are immediate. “Every few years, an oil shock somewhere else becomes a rupee crisis at home. Electrification lets India solve it at the root.” He argued that replacing imported fuel with domestically generated electricity could reduce the foreign-exchange outflow associated with energy imports.

That argument is compelling, but the meaning of energy independence must extend beyond the fuel bill. A country that imports less oil but remains exposed to concentrated sources of lithium, battery materials, solar components and processing technology has reduced one vulnerability without necessarily resolving the wider problem. India does not need to produce every mineral or component within its borders. International trade will remain part of any modern energy system. The more immediate priority is to avoid excessive dependence on a narrow group of suppliers, develop domestic processing and manufacturing, invest in recycling, and build partnerships that offer reliable access to essential materials.

The success of the transition will not be measured only by how many electric vehicles are sold or how much renewable capacity is installed. It will also depend on who makes the batteries, where the minerals are processed, how much value is added within India, and whether the supply chains can withstand disruptions. Moving away from fossil fuels is a necessary step. Ensuring that the next energy system does not reproduce the vulnerabilities of the old one may prove to be the harder task.

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