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What Is Civilisational Diplomacy? Understanding India’s Newest Foreign Policy Tool

What is civilisational diplomacy? Learn how India is using shared heritage, culture and history to strengthen strategic partnerships with countries like Indonesia.

Dipin Damodharan

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India and Indonesia strengthen ties through civilisational diplomacy
PM Modi and President Prabowo Subianto at the Prambanan Temple complex in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, during their joint visit to launch the temple's restoration project, July 2026.Image credit: PIB/India

India is increasingly using civilisational diplomacy to strengthen its foreign policy by drawing on shared history, religion, culture and heritage. From Buddhist diplomacy to temple restoration projects in Indonesia, this emerging strategy blends cultural ties with economic, security and geopolitical partnerships in an evolving Indo-Pacific landscape.

Every few years, a new phrase enters the vocabulary of Indian foreign policy. There was “non-alignment” during the Cold War, “Look East” in the 1990s, and “Act East” after 2014. Lately, another term has been showing up in official statements and think-tank papers: civilisational diplomacy.

It sounds abstract, maybe even a little grand. But strip away the jargon and the idea is fairly simple: instead of building relationships with other countries only around trade figures and security pacts, use the older, deeper connections — shared religion, language, epics, art, trade routes that go back centuries — as a foundation that makes the newer, harder cooperation easier to build.

So What Does The Term Civilisational Diplomacy Actually Mean?

Traditional diplomacy runs on interests: two governments decide they need each other for defence, energy, or market access, and they sign agreements accordingly. Soft power, a term coined by the American scholar Joseph Nye, is about a country’s culture, values and policies making it attractive to others — something like the global popularity of Indian Bollywood or Korean K-pop.

Civilisational diplomacy is a step further back in time. It leans on ties that predate the modern nation-state altogether — a shared epic, a common script, a religion that travelled along old trade routes — and treats that inheritance as a working asset in present-day foreign policy, not just a talking point for a state banquet speech.

India’s most visible version of this has been built around Buddhism. Relics of the Buddha have been sent on tour to Thailand, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam, drawing crowds in the hundreds of thousands. India has helped restore Buddhist and Hindu heritage sites well beyond its own borders — Angkor Wat in Cambodia, historic pagodas in Myanmar, and temples in Sri Lanka. The idea driving all of it is the same: countries that share a civilisational thread with India are often easier to talk to about everything else, from trade corridors to maritime security.

The India–Indonesia Version, Up Close

The most recent, and probably most fully worked-out, example of this approach played out during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Indonesia in early July 2026 — the opening leg of a longer tour that also took him to Australia and New Zealand.

India and Indonesia don’t share a border, a colonial history, or even a dominant religion today. What they do share is older than either government: Sanskrit loanwords still used in the Indonesian language, an Indonesian national airline named Garuda after the mythical bird of Hindu tradition, and a national epic tradition that draws heavily on the Ramayana and Mahabharata, still performed as ballet and shadow puppetry across Java and Bali.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto conferred on Modi the country’s highest civilian honour, the Bintang Adipurna, during the visit. The two leaders then travelled together to Prambanan, a ninth-century Hindu temple complex near Yogyakarta and one of Southeast Asia’s largest surviving Hindu monuments, where they jointly launched a restoration project. Under the plan, India’s Archaeological Survey will work alongside Indonesian heritage authorities to repair the smaller shrines scattered around the main complex, many of which have sat in ruins for decades. The two countries also agreed to mark 2026–27 as the “Tagore–Dewantara Year” of cultural and educational exchange, named after the Indian and Indonesian literary figures Rabindranath Tagore and Ki Hajar Dewantara.

What makes this moment interesting isn’t the temple visit by itself — it’s what it was bundled with. In the same set of talks, India and Indonesia signed on to a BrahMos missile deal, a maritime security framework covering the Sabang port near the Strait of Malacca, a rare-earth minerals partnership, plans to link India’s UPI payment system with Indonesia’s QRIS, and an agreement to help Indonesia build its own electronic voting machines. The temple restoration and the missile deal were announced in the same breath, not treated as separate tracks of the relationship.

Civilisational diplomacy in India's foreign policy
India is increasingly combining cultural heritage with strategic partnerships. Civilisational diplomacy is reshaping relations with Indonesia and beyond. Image credit: PIB/India

That pairing is really the point of civilisational diplomacy as a strategy: cultural gestures aren’t a substitute for hard security and economic cooperation, they’re the trust-building layer underneath it. A restoration project or a relic exhibition costs relatively little and rarely generates controversy, but it puts a government’s name on something the host country’s public already feels warmly about — which can make it politically easier to sign the bigger, more consequential deals alongside it.

Why Now, And Why This Framing

There’s a specific historical wrinkle in the India–Indonesia case that gets mentioned often in Indian commentary: in 1965, during the India–Pakistan war, Indonesia’s government was seen as closer to Pakistan. Six decades on, Jakarta is buying Indian missiles and inviting an Indian business school to open a campus on its soil. Officials frame that shift as proof that patient, culture-first diplomacy pays off over the long run — though it’s worth noting that plenty of factors besides shared heritage were behind that reversal, including changed regional security calculations and decades of separate bilateral work that had nothing to do with temples or epics.

It’s also fair to say this approach isn’t unique to India. China has pursued something structurally similar, using Buddhism as a soft-power thread through Belt and Road-linked countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Mongolia — a reminder that civilisational diplomacy is as much a competitive tool in the region as a warm, cultural one.

The Honest Caveat

Civilisational diplomacy photographs well — a prime minister at a thousand-year-old temple makes for a better headline than a memorandum on customs procedures. That’s exactly why it’s worth watching critically rather than taking entirely at face value. Shared heritage doesn’t automatically translate into aligned strategic interests, and cultural warmth between two governments can cool quickly if underlying disputes over trade, migration or security resurface. What can genuinely be said is narrower: it’s a real and increasingly deliberate instrument in India’s foreign policy toolkit, it appears to be working as intended in the Indonesia relationship at this particular moment, and it’s most useful as a companion to concrete agreements rather than a replacement for them.

Dipin Damodharan is an award-winning journalist, editor and media entrepreneur, and Co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of EdPublica, an independent global media platform covering education, science, research, innovation, climate and public policy. With more than a decade of experience in journalism, he has worked across print, digital and multimedia media. His reporting explores science, climate, sustainability and the social impact of research and innovation. His work has been recognised by the Solutions Journalism Network and other journalism organisations.

Society

79 Years After Independence: Is India Investing Enough in Science and Technology?

India’s R&D spending remains below 1% of GDP despite rising research output and patents. Is the country investing enough to achieve technological independence by 2047?

Vaishnavi V S

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India R&D spending and investment in science and technology
The bigger question is whether its investment in science is sufficient to build the technologies and industries needed for technological independence. Photo by Dibakar Roy /Pexels.

India’s research and development (R & D) spending has more than doubled in absolute terms, but R&D intensity remains below 1% of GDP. As India approaches 2047, the bigger question is whether its investment in science is sufficient to build the technologies and industries needed for technological independence.

When India became independent in 1947, the country had only 17 universities and 636 colleges serving about 2.38 lakh students. Literacy was around 14%. Nearly eight decades later, India has built a vastly larger education and research system. The country had 1,168 universities, 45,473 colleges and 12,002 standalone higher-education institutions in 2021–22, according to the All India Survey on Higher Education.

But as India looks towards its centenary of Independence in 2047, its scientific ambitions are running into a persistent question: is the country investing enough in research and development to build the technologies it will need? India’s R&D spending has increased sharply in absolute terms. Yet as a share of the economy, it has remained below 1%.

India’s R&D Spending Remains Below 1% of GDP

India’s gross expenditure on research and development rose from ₹60,197 crore in 2010–11 to ₹1,27,381 crore in 2020–21, according to the Department of Science and Technology. However, R&D expenditure as a share of GDP was 0.64% in 2020–21. The corresponding figure was 0.66% in both 2018–19 and 2019–20.

This means that while India’s research spending more than doubled over the decade, R&D intensity remained at roughly two-thirds of 1% of GDP. The latest detailed official figure available for India is therefore 0.64% for 2020–21. WIPO’s Global Innovation Index 2025 uses an R&D intensity figure of 0.65%, based on 2020 data. One of the most commonly used measures of a country’s research effort is R&D intensity—the amount a country spends on research and development as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP). It allows researchers to compare the relative priority given to R&D across economies of very different sizes.

There is currently no single internationally comparable R&D figure for every country for 2026. UNESCO’s new global R&D data collection is still underway, with the resulting data scheduled for release in November 2026.

Government Still Funds the Larger Share

The issue is not only how much India spends on R&D, but who pays for it. Government accounted for 59.2% of India’s gross expenditure on R&D in 2020–21, while business enterprises accounted for 40.8%, according to DST data.

The figures point to India’s continuing dependence on public funding for research. That becomes significant as research moves into areas such as semiconductors, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, advanced materials and clean energy. These fields can require expensive infrastructure, specialised equipment and long development cycles before research produces commercially viable technologies.

Increasing private-sector participation is therefore likely to be as important as increasing the overall R&D budget.

India is Producing More Patents and Research

Despite its relatively low R&D intensity, India has become a significant contributor to global research and innovation. The latest Nature Index data, covering April 2025 to March 2026, records 3,565 research articles from India in the journals tracked by the index.

Patent activity has also grown rapidly. Indian applicants filed 76,470 patent applications worldwide in 2024, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization. This was a 19.2% increase over 2023 and placed India sixth among origins for worldwide patent applications.

The growth marks the sixth consecutive year of double-digit growth in patent applications from India-based applicants, according to WIPO. But patent filings do not necessarily mean that inventions reach the market.

A patent can protect an invention without it becoming a commercially manufactured product. For research to generate wider economic value, it has to move through several stages—from discovery to patent, prototype, product and eventually large-scale deployment. That transition remains one of the important challenges for India’s innovation ecosystem.

India Ranks Higher on Innovation Than Its R&D Spending Suggests

India’s relatively low R&D intensity has not prevented it from performing strongly on broader measures of innovation. WIPO’s Global Innovation Index 2025 ranked India 38th among 139 economies. India was also ranked first among lower-middle-income economies and first in Central and Southern Asia.

WIPO identifies India as an innovation overperformer, citing strengths including ICT services exports, venture-capital activity and the country’s ability to translate scientific knowledge into commercial impact. The contrast is significant.

India is generating considerable innovation despite spending a relatively small share of its GDP on R&D. But that does not necessarily mean that the existing level of investment is enough to support the next generation of technologies. As research becomes more capital-intensive, countries seeking technological leadership require sustained investment in infrastructure, specialised researchers and long-term development.

China Spends Four Times India’s Share

The gap becomes clearer when India is compared with major research economies. WIPO’s latest internationally comparable estimates for 2024 put R&D intensity at 6.33% of GDP in Israel and 5.32% in South Korea. Japan and the United States were both at 3.45%, while Germany stood at 3.11%.

China’s R&D intensity reached 2.65%. By comparison, India’s latest available figure is about 0.65%. China therefore spends roughly four times India’s share of GDP on R&D. Other emerging economies also show different levels of research intensity. WIPO estimates Brazil at 1.15%, Thailand at 1.16%, Türkiye at 1.42%, Vietnam at 0.42%, the Philippines at 0.32% and Indonesia at 0.28%.

The figures are not all based on the same data year, making direct comparisons imperfect. However, the broad difference between India and the world’s leading research economies remains clear.

Government Changing The Funding Model

India has begun introducing policies aimed at expanding research funding and encouraging greater industry participation. The Anusandhan National Research Foundation was established through legislation in 2023, with a planned five-year outlay of ₹50,000 crore for 2023–28.

The foundation is intended to strengthen research across universities, colleges and research institutions and encourage collaboration between academia, industry and government.

In July 2025, the government also approved a ₹1 lakh crore Research, Development and Innovation Scheme. The scheme is intended to encourage private-sector investment in high-risk and high-impact R&D, particularly in strategic and emerging areas.

The initiatives reflect an attempt to address a longstanding problem: India’s research system needs greater private-sector participation if overall R&D investment is to rise substantially.

What Would Higher R&D Spending Change?

There is no fixed relationship between R&D spending and the number of patents, papers or technologies a country will produce. Reaching a particular percentage of GDP cannot guarantee scientific breakthroughs.

But higher sustained investment could expand the country’s research capacity. Moving from 0.64% to 1% of GDP would represent an increase of about 56% relative to India’s current R&D intensity. It could provide greater resources for research grants, laboratory infrastructure, doctoral training and advanced equipment.

At 2%, India would move much closer to China’s current R&D intensity and have a substantially larger pool of resources for research in areas such as biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, AI, semiconductors and clean energy. At 3%, India would enter the range of several major research economies. The outcome, however, would depend on how effectively that money is used.

From Research Papers to Technologies

For India, the next phase of science policy may therefore need to focus as much on the movement of research into the economy as on increasing research output. Universities need stronger research infrastructure and stable funding. Public laboratories need effective technology-transfer mechanisms. Companies need stronger incentives to conduct R&D domestically. Researchers need access to advanced equipment and long-term funding.

Success could also be measured through indicators beyond publications and patents: technologies licensed to companies, university spin-offs, industry-funded research, prototypes entering production and revenue generated from publicly supported research. This is particularly important for technologies that could shape India’s economic future.

A semiconductor process developed in an Indian laboratory, a new pharmaceutical platform, an energy-storage technology or an agricultural innovation can have an economic impact far beyond the research paper that first describes it. At the same time, basic research cannot be judged only by immediate commercial returns. Some of the technologies that eventually transform economies begin as discoveries with no obvious market.

India therefore faces a two-part challenge: expand research that pushes scientific boundaries while building the institutions and industrial capacity needed to convert discoveries into technologies.

The Science Challenge India Faces in 2047

The scientific challenge India faced in 1947 was largely about building capacity. The country needed universities, laboratories, trained researchers and institutions capable of supporting scientific inquiry. Much of that foundation now exists.

The challenge approaching 2047 is different. India is no longer simply trying to establish a scientific system. It is trying to use that system to compete in technologies that will determine economic and strategic strength. That will require more sustained investment, greater participation from industry and stronger links between research institutions and the market.

India R&D Spending: Is It Enough to Power Science by 2047?
As India approaches 2047, the bigger question is whether its investment in science is sufficient to build the technologies and industries needed for technological independence.Photo by Adam Saad/Pexels

As India approaches 100 years of Independence, the question is therefore no longer only how much science the country produces. It is whether India can invest enough in that science—and build the systems around it—to turn research into technologies, technologies into industries and scientific capability into technological independence.

Editor’s Note

Dipin Damodharan, Co-founder & Editor-in-Chief, EdPublica

South Korea offers an instructive comparison. R&D intensity—the share of a country’s GDP devoted to research and development—is not, by itself, a guarantee of economic transformation. But South Korea’s experience shows what sustained investment can achieve when it is accompanied by strong university research, private-sector participation and technological development.

UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics reported that South Korea’s R&D expenditure had reached 4.03% of GDP in 2011, compared with 0.81% for India at the time. The private sector accounted for a substantial share of South Korea’s R&D expenditure, highlighting the importance of industry participation alongside public investment.

The lesson for India is therefore not simply to spend more. It is to build an ecosystem in which increased R&D funding translates into research capacity, technologies, companies and productive industries.

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Climate

From Fighting Water to Saving It: The Netherlands Faces a Growing Drought Challenge

A land built to keep water out is now struggling to keep enough of it in — forcing a world leader in water management to rethink its infrastructure

Sebin Pious

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Netherlands drought challenge
Low water levels on the Nederrijn near Arnhem's Andrej Sacharovbrug, 5 August 2026. Photo: Tomas Guus / Wikimedia Commons (CC0)

The Netherlands built its global reputation by keeping water out. Now, longer dry spells and intensifying heatwaves are forcing the country to confront a very different problem: how to keep enough fresh water in the landscape. From greenhouse agriculture to homes built on wooden foundation piles, the Netherlands drought challenge is exposing the limits of infrastructure designed primarily for flood protection.

When people think of the Netherlands, the images that come to mind are windmills, tulip fields and the great sea walls that have kept the ocean at bay for centuries. The Dutch built their reputation, and much of their nation, on mastering water — pumping it away, holding it back, and reclaiming land from the sea to build a prosperous country on ground that, by rights, shouldn’t exist. Yet beneath that carefully engineered landscape, the Netherlands is now facing an unfamiliar problem: it is running out of fresh water.

As repeated summer heatwaves sweep across Western Europe, Dutch water authorities say they have reached the limit of what engineering can do. In several regions, officials have exhausted every standard measure available to them and are left with what amounts to a last resort — waiting, and hoping, for rain.

Netherlands Drought Challenge: From Floods to Water Scarcity

To understand how a country famous for its rainfall and rivers has arrived at this point, it helps to look at how the land itself was designed. For generations, the Dutch water system had one job: get excess water out to sea as fast as possible, to prevent flooding. That same efficiency has become a liability as weather patterns shift towards longer dry spells and more intense heat. The pressure peaks in late summer, when temperatures regularly cross 35°C and water evaporates faster than rainfall can replace it.

The consequences of shrinking water reserves go well beyond the daily weather report. They are already reaching into the economy, and into the foundations — quite literally — of Dutch homes.

Thousands of historic Dutch houses stand on wooden foundation piles. When groundwater levels drop, those piles are exposed to air and begin to rot. On clay and peat soils, the ground shrinks unevenly, pulling foundations down and cracking brick walls

Economic Strain and Sinking Homes

In Westland, the heart of Dutch greenhouse horticulture, the Delfland water authority has banned growers from drawing irrigation water from local ditches and canals — the first such ban in its history. According to the growers’ umbrella body Glastuinbouw Nederland, the ban affects around 150 commercial growers, with potential damages running as high as €150 million.

At the same time, a quieter crisis is unfolding beneath people’s homes. Thousands of historic Dutch houses stand on wooden foundation piles. When groundwater levels drop, those piles are exposed to air and begin to rot. On clay and peat soils, the ground shrinks unevenly, pulling foundations down and cracking brick walls. The Council for the Living Environment and Infrastructure estimates that close to half a million buildings across the country could show foundation damage by 2035, with repair costs reaching as much as €54 billion.

From Water Battle to Water Sponge

This reality is forcing a fundamental shift in how the Netherlands manages its resources. For centuries, Dutch policy was simple: fight the water, and push it away. Today, water authorities are engaged in a delicate balancing act, trying to save every drop using canal locks and storage basins. But holding onto existing water can only do so much once the rain stops altogether.

Long-term resilience will require redesigning the landscape itself. Rather than treating rainwater as a threat to be flushed out to sea, experts increasingly argue that the Netherlands needs to function more like a giant sponge — capturing heavy winter rain and storing it safely to survive the dry summer months that are becoming the norm.

A Lesson Beyond Borders

What is unfolding in the Netherlands carries a lesson well beyond it. If a nation this experienced in water engineering is struggling to keep pace with a changing climate, it says something about how quickly conditions can outrun even the most sophisticated infrastructure. As riverbeds stay low and the dry spells drag on, the Dutch find themselves in an unfamiliar position for a country built on water: waiting for the skies to open.

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Society

Urban Women Hit by a Stark 8.7% Unemployment Rate

India’s unemployment rate rose to 5.4% in April–June 2026, but the sharpest divide was among urban workers: women faced 8.7% unemployment, while only 22.8% were employed compared with 70.7% of men.

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Women wearing masks march in a protest, holding a sign that reads “WE WANT JOB SECURITY.”
Women participate in a protest demanding job security, highlighting concerns over employment and workplace stability. Representational image. Image credit: Rsapmech/Pexels

India’s urban labour market continues to show a persistent gender imbalance, even as overall employment trends remain relatively stable. While unemployment rates are often used as the primary indicator of job stress, they do not fully capture who is able to access work in the first place.

India’s latest employment data reveal a divide larger than the headline unemployment rate. In April–June 2026, 8.7% of urban women aged 15 years and above who were in the labour force were unemployed, compared with 6.1% of urban men. But the sharper gap lies in employment itself: only 22.8% of urban women were working, compared with 70.7% of urban men.

The figures come as India’s overall unemployment rate rose to 5.4%, from 5.0% in January–March, according to the latest Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Quarterly Bulletin released by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. Rural unemployment rose from 4.3% to 4.8%, while urban unemployment remained almost unchanged at 6.7%.

For urban women, unemployment actually fell from 9.1% to 8.7% over the quarter. Yet it remains considerably higher than the rate for men.

That makes the story less about a sudden rise in female unemployment and more about a persistent question: why are so few urban women participating in paid work?

The Bigger Divide is Participation

The unemployment rate counts people who are working or actively seeking and available for work. Those outside the labour force are not counted as unemployed.

That distinction is crucial. The urban Worker Population Ratio (WPR) stood at 46.8% overall in April–June. But the gender gap was stark: 70.7% for men and just 22.8% for women.

The nearly 48-percentage-point difference means that looking only at the 8.7% female unemployment rate captures only part of the employment problem. India can therefore have a relatively stable urban unemployment rate while still having a large pool of women who are not participating in the labour market.

Unemployment and gender gap in employment.
Women work on a production floor, illustrating the growing importance of women’s participation in India’s urban workforce amid persistent gender gaps in employment. Image credit: EqualStock IN/Pexels

Urban Jobs are Changing, But the Gender Gap Remains

The urban labour market itself is not showing signs of a broad collapse. Urban unemployment edged up only marginally from 6.6% to 6.7% during the quarter. At the same time, the share of urban workers in regular wage or salaried employment increased from 48.9% to 49.3%.

Urban employment is also dominated by services. The tertiary sector accounted for 62% of urban employment in April–June, compared with 61.7% a year earlier.

Yet these shifts have not translated into comparable employment outcomes for women.

Rural Unemployment Rose Faster

The national increase in unemployment was partly driven by rural India. Rural unemployment rose by 0.5 percentage points, compared with a 0.1-point increase in urban areas. At the same time, rural employment continued to shift away from agriculture: agriculture’s share fell from 55.8% to 52.9%, while the secondary sector rose from 22.6% to 24.4%.

chart visualization

The figures point to an economy undergoing changes in where and how people work, even as access to employment remains uneven.

Women’s Participation Also Fell

The gender gap extends beyond cities. Overall female labour-force participation declined from 34.7% in January–March to 33.2% in April–June. The overall LFPR for people aged 15 and above also fell, from 55.5% to 54.6%.

The latest figures should not be interpreted as proof that women simply lost jobs. LFPR measures participation in the labour force, while WPR measures actual employment.

But together, the indicators highlight a persistent challenge: India’s employment story cannot be understood through unemployment alone.

The Question of Gender Gap

The PLFS does not establish why urban women participate in the labour market at much lower rates than men. Factors such as childcare, household responsibilities, transport, workplace conditions, safety and access to suitable jobs require separate evidence and reporting.

What the data do establish is the scale of the divide. Urban female unemployment is 8.7%, compared with 6.1% for men. But the much larger gap is in actual employment: 22.8% of urban women were working, against 70.7% of urban men.

As India’s urban economy becomes increasingly service-led and regular salaried employment expands, the central employment question is no longer only how many jobs are being created. It is also who is able to enter the workforce and stay in it.

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