India is preparing to open its civilian nuclear power sector to wider private participation as it attempts to increase nuclear capacity more than elevenfold by 2047. The country currently has 8.78 GW of installed nuclear capacity across 24 reactors, contributing about 3.1% of electricity generation. The government wants to raise this to 100 GW by 2047.

That means adding more than 91 GW in two decades.

The scale of the ambition explains the policy shift. The government expects nuclear capacity to reach around 22 GW by 2031–32. Beyond that, NPCIL is expected to account for about 54 GW by 2047, while the remaining 46 GW is expected to come from other public-sector enterprises, state governments, private companies and joint ventures. The 46-GW figure is crucial. Private participation is not simply an experiment in changing ownership. It has become part of the government’s arithmetic for reaching 100 GW.

But opening the sector does not guarantee that the reactors will be built. The harder questions concern finance, construction, technology, safety, liability and who ultimately bears the risks of nuclear power.

Why Nuclear Power When Renewables are Expanding?

India’s nuclear power expansion is taking place alongside a much larger renewable-energy programme. By June 2026, renewable-energy capacity had reached 288.58 GW, including 162.15 GW of solar, 57.44 GW of wind and 57.24 GW of hydropower. So why invest heavily in nuclear?

The government’s argument is that the two technologies perform different functions. Solar and wind generation varies with weather and time of day, while nuclear reactors are designed to provide continuous generation.

Nuclear power is therefore being positioned as a source of firm, low-carbon electricity alongside renewables, rather than as a replacement for them. That distinction matters as electricity demand rises. Government projections put India’s peak demand at around 446 GW in 2034–35, with electricity requirements of about 3,215 billion units.

The projected power mix for that year includes 22 GW of nuclear, 679 GW of renewable and 327 GW of thermal capacity. The question, then, is not whether India needs electricity. It clearly does. The question is how much nuclear capacity makes economic sense within an electricity system increasingly dominated by renewables and supported by storage and other technologies.

What Actually Changes Under the New Framework?

The SHANTI Act, 2025 provides the legal framework for wider participation in specified civilian nuclear activities. This is not unrestricted privatisation. Private entities remain subject to government licensing and nuclear-safety requirements.

The significance is that the pool of potential participants can now extend beyond the traditional state-controlled nuclear establishment. The government expects this to create opportunities for private investment, manufacturing, technology development and new project structures. But permission to participate is not the same as willingness to invest.

Nuclear power projects are expensive, technically complex and slow to build. Investors have to commit large amounts of capital long before a plant begins generating revenue. That is why the success of the reform will depend less on how many companies enter the sector and more on whether they are willing to put substantial capital behind actual projects.

Can Private Capital Solve the Financing Problem?

The strongest case for private participation is that it could broaden the pool of capital available for nuclear construction. The government’s own roadmap makes clear that NPCIL is not expected to deliver the entire 100-GW target. About 46 GW must come from other public-sector entities, states, private companies and joint ventures.

But private participation should not automatically be equated with lower costs. Globally, nuclear projects have faced problems with construction delays, cost overruns and high financing requirements. The International Energy Agency has identified these as major challenges for nuclear investment.

For India, the critical questions will therefore be whether private investors can secure affordable financing, whether projects can be completed on schedule and whether the electricity generated can remain competitive with other sources. The reform changes who can invest. It does not remove the underlying economics of nuclear construction.

The SMR Bet

India is also placing considerable emphasis on small modular reactors. The government has allocated INR 20,000 crore to research, development and deployment of indigenous SMRs and aims to have at least five operational by 2033. BARC is developing the 220-MWe BSMR-200 and 55-MWe SMR-55, among other designs. The government sees potential applications in captive industrial power, replacing retiring fossil-fuel capacity and locations where conventional large reactors may be less suitable.

But India’s indigenous SMR designs are still under development. Their eventual contribution to the 100-GW target will depend on whether they can move from demonstration to commercially viable deployment. For now, SMRs are an important part of India’s nuclear power strategy, not a guaranteed solution to its capacity challenge.

The Liability Question

The most consequential issue for private investors may be nuclear liability. The SHANTI framework retains no-fault liability for nuclear operators while establishing graded limits depending on the category and size of a nuclear installation. The draft rules propose operator liability ranging from INR 100 crore to INR 3,000 crore.

The government argues that a clearer liability structure will make investment and insurance more predictable. But there is another side to the question: is the statutory compensation framework sufficient if an accident causes losses far beyond the operator’s liability?

That issue is now before the Supreme Court. On 17 August 2026, the court sought clarification from the Union government on whether constitutional courts would remain able to determine fair and just compensation following a nuclear power accident under the new framework. The court has not struck down the liability provisions. But the proceedings highlight an important tension in the reform: making risk predictable for investors while ensuring that victims are adequately protected.

Nuclear Power: Who Bears the Long-term Risks?

Nuclear power also raises questions that cannot be reduced to the cost of electricity. A major accident could affect workers, nearby communities, livelihoods and ecosystems far beyond the balance sheet of the company operating the facility.

Radioactive waste presents a different challenge. Electricity generated today can create waste that requires management over much longer periods. The government retains responsibility for certain aspects of spent-fuel management, while licensed entities are responsible for managing radioactive waste generated through their activities.

This raises an intergenerational question: How should today’s electricity consumers ensure that future generations are not left with the financial and environmental burden of today’s nuclear expansion?

There is also a question of distribution. Nuclear power facilities require land, water and supporting infrastructure. Communities near proposed projects can therefore bear costs that are spread much more widely across the country than the benefits and electricity generated by the plant.

A larger nuclear power programme will need credible mechanisms for land acquisition, rehabilitation, emergency preparedness, compensation and public participation. Safety cannot become secondary to speed The government maintains that expanding private participation will not mean lowering safety standards.

Does the regulatory system has enough independence, technical capacity and enforcement power to oversee a larger and more commercially diverse nuclear power industry? That becomes particularly important when project developers have strong financial incentives to control costs and meet construction schedules.

A successful private nuclear power model therefore requires more than investment rules. It requires strong regulation that can remain independent of both political and commercial pressure.

The Real Test is Beyond the 100-GW Target

India’s nuclear power ambition is clear: 8.78 GW today, 22 GW by 2031–32, 100 GW by 2047. The government expects NPCIL to deliver roughly 54 GW of that eventual capacity and other public and private entities to account for the remaining 46 GW.

The SHANTI Act makes that wider participation possible. But it does not guarantee that private companies will invest, that projects will be financed cheaply, that reactors will be built on time or that nuclear power will remain economically attractive as renewables and storage expand.

Nor does it settle the ethical questions around liability, waste, community impacts and long-term risk. That is why the success of the reform should not be measured simply by the number of companies that enter the nuclear sector. The real test will be whether India can build enough nuclear capacity at a reasonable cost while maintaining strong safety oversight and ensuring that the risks are not disproportionately transferred to communities, taxpayers or future generations.

India is putting INR 23,731 crore behind an effort to make compressed biogas (CBG) a larger part of its energy system, with the government targeting nearly ten-fold growth in domestic CBG production by 2035-36. The GOBARdhan scheme will combine assured demand, price support, capital assistance, pipeline connectivity and credit guarantees to expand the industry.

The push comes as India remains heavily dependent on imported gas. The government says nearly 50% of the country’s natural gas requirement is met through imports, while about 55–60% of India’s LNG imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This dependence makes domestically produced alternatives more relevant to energy security.

From 5,000 Plants to 217

India’s CBG ambitions are not new. The Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation (SATAT) initiative, launched in 2018, envisaged 5,000 CBG plants producing 15 million tonnes annually by 2023-24. The target was missed.

The sector has nevertheless grown. As of August 6, 2026, 1,908 CBG/Bio-CNG plants were registered, of which 217 had been commissioned and another 339 were under construction.

The numbers show both progress and the scale of the challenge: only a fraction of registered projects have reached operation, while hundreds remain under construction.

What is Different This Time?

The new scheme attempts to address one of the industry’s central problems: making CBG projects financially predictable.

City Gas Distribution companies will face a CBG blending obligation of 3% in 2026-27, 4% in 2027-28 and 5% from 2028-29 for CNG transport and domestic PNG. The government will also provide an administered CBG price of INR 2,110 per MMBTU, with a minimum ten-year horizon. Eligible greenfield projects can receive capital assistance of up to INR 2 crore per tonne per day of installed capacity.

The scheme also provides pipeline support and a credit guarantee mechanism, aimed at reducing infrastructure and financing barriers.

In other words, the government is trying to create not just more plants, but a predictable market for the gas those plants produce.

Where is the Industry Growing?

CBG development remains concentrated geographically. Uttar Pradesh is among the leading states, while Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka and Maharashtra also have significant numbers of projects. The new scheme could allow these existing hubs to expand while opening opportunities in states with large agricultural and municipal-waste streams but limited CBG infrastructure.

Kerala illustrates the latter challenge. The state recently moved into the sector with the Brahmapuram CBG plant in Kochi, commissioned in February 2026 and designed to process 150 tonnes of source-segregated biodegradable municipal waste every day.

This points to one of CBG’s central propositions: waste that would otherwise require disposal can become both fuel and a source of organic manure.

The Waste-to-Energy Opportunity

CBG can be produced from agricultural residue, cattle dung, press mud and biodegradable municipal waste. The process also generates organic fertiliser, potentially creating an additional revenue stream for producers.

But the availability of biomass alone does not guarantee a viable plant. Feedstock must be collected, transported, stored and supplied consistently. This is particularly important for agricultural residues, which are seasonal and geographically dispersed.

The new scheme therefore includes provisions for feedstock mapping and aggregation infrastructure, alongside a district-level challenge fund.

What Does the Government Expect?

The government estimates that the scheme could displace 10 million tonnes of fossil fuel over the next decade and generate around 40,000 crore rupees in foreign-exchange savings. It projects an additional 75,000 crore rupees contribution to GDP, more than 1.5 lakh jobs, over 40 million tonnes of CO₂-equivalent emissions avoided, and production of more than 250 million tonnes of organic fertiliser. These are government projections, not realised outcomes.

The projections underline the government’s broader ambition: CBG is being positioned not simply as an alternative fuel, but as a link between energy security, waste management, agriculture, employment and emissions reduction.

The Implementation Test

India now has a growing pipeline of CBG projects, a policy-backed market and financial incentives. But its earlier experience shows that ambitious targets do not automatically translate into operational plants. The success of GOBARdhan will ultimately depend on whether developers can secure reliable feedstock, obtain financing, connect plants to gas markets and operate them sustainably.

India has no shortage of organic waste. The challenge is turning that resource into a reliable, commercially viable and geographically widespread source of renewable gas.

India is adding solar power rapidly. But as more panels are installed, another question is becoming harder to ignore: where will all of them be installed? Floating solar offers one possible answer. Large ground-mounted solar projects require vast, contiguous parcels of land. This is easier in states such as Rajasthan and Gujarat, which have abundant land and high solar radiation. But the model is harder to replicate in densely populated, land-constrained states such as Kerala.

The Union Cabinet’s approval of the Pradhan Mantri Surya Sarovar Yojana, a ₹5,070-crore scheme, seeks to address this constraint by expanding solar generation to reservoirs and other water bodies. The programme will provide central financial assistance of up to ₹1 crore per MW for floating solar projects and aims to add 5,000 MW by 2030–31. It will be implemented by the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI). India currently has only around 0.7 GW of installed floating solar capacity, despite an estimated potential of 102 GW.

How Is This Beneficial for Small States?

India’s solar expansion has been concentrated largely in Rajasthan and Gujarat, where large areas of relatively inexpensive land and strong solar radiation have supported utility-scale projects. But land acquisition can involve rehabilitation and resettlement, while large solar parks can compete with agriculture and other land uses.

Floating solar offers another option: generating electricity from suitable water surfaces without occupying large areas of land. This could be particularly relevant for states with limited land availability. Kerala, for example, faces much greater competition for land from settlements, agriculture and infrastructure than states with large open tracts.

But not every reservoir can become a solar park. Water bodies have multiple uses, including drinking water, irrigation, fisheries and power generation. Projects would therefore need careful site selection and environmental assessment.

Addressing The Storage Dilemma

The programme does not stop at adding solar panels. Projects receiving support will have to include battery energy storage equivalent to at least two hours of generation. Across the programme, this is expected to amount to around **10,000 MWh of storage. That addresses another challenge facing India’s renewable-energy transition.

Solar generation peaks during the day, while electricity demand can remain high into the evening. Batteries can store excess solar power and release it when demand rises. Storage could also reduce renewable-energy curtailment, when available electricity is not used because the grid cannot absorb all the generation. The scheme therefore combines two priorities: adding renewable capacity and making that power more useful to the grid.

The 278-MW Omkareshwar floating solar park on the Narmada River in Madhya Pradesh’s Khandwa district is currently the country’s largest floating solar project. Plans are in place to scale it up to 600 MW. However, the project does not have on-site battery storage. The new scheme could encourage a different model, where floating solar and storage are developed together from the beginning.

But Water Is Not Empty Space

Floating solar can ease pressure on land, but it comes with its own environmental and technical questions. Large installations can affect aquatic ecosystems, water quality, fisheries and other uses of reservoirs. The technology can also be more expensive and technically complex than ground-mounted solar. This makes site selection critical. The question is not simply how much floating solar India can install, but where it can be installed without creating new environmental or social costs.

A New Option For India’s Energy Transition

The government’s 5,000-MW target is small compared with India’s estimated 102 GW floating solar potential. But the scheme could help move the technology from a niche application towards a larger role in India’s renewable-energy system. Its significance lies elsewhere.

India’s renewable transition is increasingly about where clean-energy infrastructure can be built and how the electricity can be delivered when it is needed. Floating solar could help address both challenges — using suitable water surfaces to reduce pressure on scarce land while pairing solar generation with storage.

For land-constrained states such as Kerala, that could open another avenue for renewable-energy expansion. Nationally, the scheme could help India find new spaces for clean energy — without assuming that every available piece of land must become a solar park.