El Niño is a natural climate phenomenon in which surface waters in the central and eastern Pacific Ocean become significantly warmer than average. While El Niño events occur every 2–7 years, a Super El Niño is far more intense, typically marked by unusually high sea surface temperature anomalies (often exceeding +2°C). Climate models indicate a two-in-three chance of a strong to very strong El Niño developing, placing this year in the rare category of “Super El Niño” events, which have occurred only four times since 1950. The most notable recent Super El Niño occurred during 2015–16 and had major global climate impacts. Nearly a decade later, scientists are closely monitoring conditions for signs of a similar event, though its recurrence is not yet certain.
What makes a “Super” El Niño different?
In a normal El Niño, weakened trade winds allow warm water to spread eastward across the Pacific. A Super El Niño amplifies this process, disrupting global atmospheric circulation more dramatically. Global warming is adding further complexity, intensifying heat, altering rainfall patterns, and increasing risks to water, food, and health systems.
There is a recurring pattern where the peak heat impact often follows strong El Niño year, as seen when 2024 became the hottest year after the 2023 El Niño. Projections for 2026 suggest that the most intense heat may extend into 2027, making the period break the existing record. As a result, the upcoming event may lead to more prolonged and sustained heat stress known to humanity.
Southwest Monsoon Rainfall during El Niño years. Source: Climate Trends
What does it mean for India?
For India, a Super El Niño does not have a uniform impact. The risks posed by a potential El Niño go beyond weather disruptions, extending deep into India’s economic stability. As Archana Chaudhary, Associate Director at Climate Trends, explains, “The risk India faces is not simply a weak monsoon or a hot year in isolation. It is a compound shock hitting the Indian economy… If a strong El Niño brings erratic rainfall alongside prolonged heat, while geopolitical tensions keep energy prices elevated, India could face pressure from several directions at once: food inflation, weaker rural demand, lower labour productivity, higher electricity and irrigation costs, water stress for industry and rising fiscal burdens.”
While parts of Maharashtra and Uttarakhand have experienced lower rainfall, water shortages, and warmer conditions, regions in the Northeast and along the west coast have received relatively higher rainfall and increased storm activity. Heavy rainfall reported in parts of West Bengal highlights that El Niño does not affect all regions of India in the same way. There are indications that similar uneven patterns could re-emerge. Authorities have urged farmers to be prepared for the kharif season, citing the possibility of variable rainfall conditions.
The Signs of a Pattern Reappearing
Studies show that the 2015 monsoon was significantly below average (around 86% of the long-period average), with rainfall declining after June and showing high variability. This led to drought-like conditions in several regions, reduced soil moisture, and stress on kharif crops. At the same time, India experienced one of its deadliest heatwaves, with temperatures crossing 45°C and causing over 2,500 deaths, particularly in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
The emerging 2026 Super El Niño, comparable to the 2015–16 event, is already showing signs of producing similar but more complex impacts on India’s climate. According to the India Meteorological Department, the 2026 southwest monsoon is projected at around 90% of the Long Period Average, with a 60% probability of deficient rainfall, figures close to the deficit observed during 2015. However, unlike 2015, when the impact was seen primarily as a widespread rainfall deficit and deadly heatwaves, current projections highlight greater intra-seasonal variability, with longer dry spells,break-monsoon conditions, and uneven rainfall distribution. Experts also warn that delayed monsoon progression could trigger humid heatwaves across northwest India. while the event may push 2026–27 toward record global and national temperatures.
Strain on India’s Climate Systems
According to scientists at the India Meteorological Department (IMD), El Niño is “one of the most important Ocean–atmosphere phenomena influencing the Indian monsoon,” but it does not act alone. There are also other factors at play, such as the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and regional circulation patterns. They can either amplify or offset its effects.
Super El Niño increases the probability of climatic stress. Overlapping challenges from fuel price volatility and supply disruptions to climate extremes are growing more difficult to address in tandem. The combined pressure of heat, low rainfall and global economic shocks is pushing India’s already stretched systems toward greater instability. With rising baseline temperatures, even a typical El Niño can now produce more extreme outcomes, making preparedness, water management, and climate-resilient agriculture increasingly critical.
EP Staff is the editorial team at EdPublica, an independent media organisation focused on science, education, environment and public policy. The team produces evidence-based news, features, explainers and analysis on issues that shape society and everyday life.
India’s electricity is shifting fast to non-fossil sources — but oil, gas and LPG imports are set to rise, not fall, under the IEA’s projections to 2035. Illustration: EdPublica
IEA’sWorld Energy Outlook 2026 has India’s electricity shifting fast towards non-fossil sources. For oil, gas and cooking fuel, the same projections show more imports, not fewer.
India has said since 2021 that it wants to be energy independent by 2047. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2026, published on 19 November, does not say India is on course for that. Its projections stop at 2035, and for oil and gas they point the other way.
India already meets about 40 per cent of its energy needs through imports, including 90 per cent of its crude oil and 50 per cent of its natural gas, according to the Outlook. Over the next decade its energy demand is projected to grow by 2.5 per cent a year in the agency’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), roughly three times the global rate. STEPS counts existing policies plus measures that governments have formally proposed. “In all our scenarios, India accounts for more growth in energy demand over the next decade than any other country or region in the world,” the IEA said.
The picture is uneven. Electricity is moving quickly away from imported fuel. Oil and LPG are not. And the one scenario in the Outlook where India pushes harder on imports shows gains that are real but partial.
Is India Really Heading Toward Energy Independence?
India’s electricity generation rises from 2,114 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2025 to 3,585 TWh in 2035 under STEPS, an increase of about 70 per cent. The non-fossil share, meaning renewables and nuclear, goes from 28 per cent to 51 per cent. “As non-fossil capacity continues to expand, India generates well over half of its electricity from non-fossil sources by 2035 in the STEPS,” the report says. Solar PV accounted for half of India’s capacity additions over the past decade.
Illustration: EdPublica
A quick calculation with those rounded shares adds a wrinkle. Non-fossil output roughly triples, from about 590 TWh to about 1,830 TWh. But fossil generation, 72 per cent of the 2025 total and 49 per cent of the 2035 total, still rises from about 1,520 TWh to about 1,760 TWh, an increase of around 15 per cent. The share of coal and gas falls while the amount of electricity made from them goes up. (These are our own calculations from rounded IEA shares, not figures the IEA publishes.)
Globally, Ben Backwell, chair of the Global Renewables Alliance, pointed to the IEA’s expectation that “Renewables are now expected to grow from 33% of electricity generation today to around 50%, and potentially even higher, by 2035.” India’s non-fossil share, which includes nuclear, goes from 28 to 51 per cent over the same years. The measures differ, but the direction and rough scale are similar.
Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, reads the Hormuz crisis as an accelerant. “Hormuz will speed up electrification and renewables, likely faster than many people think,” he said. The IEA’s own summary lists a push for faster electrification among the common responses it sees from countries hit by the crisis.
Oil and LPG: the other direction
Domestic crude production is projected to fall by nearly 20 per cent by 2035 under STEPS. Over the same period refining capacity grows by about 1 million barrels a day from nearly 6 million in 2025, with another 840,000 barrels a day already under construction, 660,000 of it expansions at existing plants and 180,000 greenfield. India ranks fourth in the world by refining capacity and third by refinery runs, and it remains a net exporter of petroleum products. But a larger refining industry fed by a shrinking home supply means more crude has to come from abroad.
The Outlook expects crude imports from the Middle East to stay broadly flat while total imports rise, with most of the extra supply coming from outside the Gulf. West Asia supplied roughly half of India’s refinery intake in 2025.
Cooking gas is the sharper problem. India produced about 450,000 barrels a day of LPG in 2025, around 40 per cent of what it uses. Under STEPS, domestic supply grows by less than 100,000 barrels a day by 2035 while demand grows by nearly 400,000, which could take LPG imports to nearly 1 million barrels a day.
This year showed what that exposure costs. The IEA estimates that the LPG used in half of India’s residential cooking cylinders passes through the Strait of Hormuz. LPG imports fell by more than 50 per cent in the first two months of the conflict, and the government maximised domestic production and put household supplies ahead of other users. “The Strait of Hormuz remains critical to India’s energy security,” the report said.
IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol put the wider lesson plainly. “I don’t see any credible pathway for the energy world to return to the way it was before,” he said. He also warned that “In pursuit of greater energy security, countries must take care not to replace one dependency with another.”
What a harder push would buy
The Outlook includes a scenario in which India goes further to cut its reliance on imported fuel: faster adoption of electric vehicles, more industrial electrification, better efficiency, more renewables and more domestic coal. By 2035 electric car adoption is 30 per cent faster than under STEPS. India’s oil requirement is 580,000 barrels a day lower and its natural gas use is 8 per cent lower than in STEPS.
For scale, Jan Rosenow, Professor of Energy and Climate Policy at the University of Oxford, noted that “China’s electric vehicle fleet, for example, is avoiding around 1.5 million barrels of oil a day.” The baselines differ, since that is China’s fleet today and India’s figure is an extra saving in 2035, but it gives a sense of the size of the prize. Rosenow’s broader point was that “countries which had electrified more of their energy use were better protected from this year’s supply shock.”
Coal does much of the work on the import side. Greater domestic coal production could bring steam coal imports down from nearly 150 million tonnes of coal equivalent in 2025 to around 30 million by 2035, and cut overall coal import dependence from about 30 per cent to 15 per cent. But rising steel output pushes coking coal demand up by 55 per cent, and India would still depend on imports for much of that extra requirement.
That sits awkwardly with climate goals, and campaigners have said so. David Tong of Oil Change International said the IEA “has yet again reiterated that there is no room for new oil, gas, and coal beyond existing fields to limit global warming to 1.5ºC.” Maria Pastukhova of E3G made a different point about the global picture: “over three quarters of the additional reduction in oil and gas imports that could result from policy responses to the Hormuz crisis comes from energy efficiency, electrification and renewables.” That is a worldwide figure, not an Indian one.
The cooling load
Over the next decade India is expected to add more than 12,000 cars to its roads every day, see a 33 per cent increase in built-up space and install another 200 million air conditioners. Globally, the IEA finds that energy needed to keep buildings cool is now overtaking the energy needed to heat them for the first time.
Pastukhova called this one of the report’s most alarming and least noticed findings: “by 2035, cooling will account for 30% of global peak electricity demand.” She added that “In emerging and developing economies outside China, 85% of households are exposed to high temperatures, yet fewer than one in five of these households have air conditioning.” India is in that group. Her warning on the fix was blunt: “Falling clean technology costs alone will not prevent it”.
Air conditioning is what drives peak demand, and the Outlook says coal will keep an important role in meeting India’s electricity demand. Anyone judging how independent India’s power system can become by 2047 has to count that load.
Reading 2047 against the data
The 2047 goal was announced by the Prime Minister in his 2021 Independence Day speech, with the stated aim of bolstering energy security by reducing imports. The IEA’s own policies database lists it as announced. The Outlook does not test it directly, because its projections end in 2035.
The case that it can be done comes from elsewhere. A 2023 modelling study from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory set out a pathway to near-complete energy independence by 2047 across power, transport and industry, mainly by cutting imported oil used in road transport and imported coal used in industry and power.
Set against the IEA’s numbers, the power half of that pathway is visibly under way. The oil half is not yet there. Under STEPS, crude output falls, refining grows and LPG imports climb. The stronger scenario narrows the gap but does not close it, and it leans on coal to do so.
Birol said that “energy security and energy transitions have never been so closely aligned.” For India, the next decade will show whether that alignment reaches the fuels it buys from abroad, or stays mostly in the power grid.
Challenge AI on Climate Science, and It May Abandon the Facts
A UNESCO–UCL study finds that AI models can abandon established climate-science evidence when users challenge their answers. The research also identifies weaknesses in climate-policy reasoning and significant differences in performance across languages, raising questions about the reliability of AI-generated climate information.
AI models' accuracy fell by up to 35.1 percentage points when users persistently challenged their answers, regardless of the professional identity they claimed, according to the UNESCO–UCL study.Image credit: UNESCO
Artificial intelligence models can explain established climate science with impressive accuracy. But when users challenge their answers, present new evidence or ask them to assess complex climate policies, their reliability declines sharply. A new UNESCO–University College London (UCL) study warns that the fluency of AI-generated explanations can conceal serious weaknesses in how these systems evaluate climate information.
The report was presented at COP31 in Antalya on November 16. Researchers tested up to 33 leading models against nine climate and environmental datasets, across 13 languages. They also assessed 656 climate-policy questions against En-ROADS, a climate–energy simulation tool.
The findings reveal a distinction between recalling established scientific knowledge and reliably assessing evidence. On questions about established climate science, the best-performing models scored between 88% and 96%. But when asked whether new evidence supported or contradicted accepted scientific claims, even the strongest systems achieved only 71–77% accuracy.
When AI agrees instead of correcting misinformation
One of the study’s most concerning findings concerns sycophancy — the tendency of AI systems to agree with users even when they are wrong.
Researchers tested 15 large language models using climate claims, including the assertion that carbon dioxide is not the main driver of climate change. Although the models initially answered neutral questions accurately, roughly eight in ten abandoned a correct answer at the first sign of user disagreement.
The problem intensified when users claimed professional expertise or introduced fabricated evidence. A false assertion from someone identifying themselves as a climate scientist reduced average accuracy by 12.9 percentage points. When users sustained their challenges over several exchanges, accuracy fell by between 30.9 and 35.1 percentage points. All 15 models were affected.
The researchers attribute this behaviour partly to training incentives that reward agreeable and validating responses. Leona Verdadero, UNESCO’s lead author, said AI could make complex climate science more accessible, but warned that its tendency to agree with users undermines its reliability as a source of established facts.
Policy analysis exposes another weakness
The report found that strong performance on individual climate questions does not translate into reliable policy analysis.
Using En-ROADS, researchers examined whether models could identify the effects of individual policy measures and understand what happens when two measures are implemented together. The best-performing model achieved 94.5% accuracy when identifying the direction of an individual policy’s effect on projected warming.
But when asked whether the combined effect of two policies would be greater than, smaller than or approximately equal to the sum of their individual effects, average accuracy fell to 33.8%. With three possible answers, random guessing would produce 33.3%.
This matters because climate policies rarely operate independently. Measures can overlap, reinforce one another or reduce each other’s effects through changes in energy demand, fuel prices and emissions. Increasing model size did not meaningfully resolve this weakness.
UCL senior author Dr Maria Perez-Ortiz cautioned that AI systems’ ability to explain scientific knowledge could create a false sense of their wider capabilities, particularly when users move from asking what is known about climate change to asking what should be done.
The problem extends to how people interpret AI responses
Other research suggests that the issue is not limited to the accuracy of a model’s answers. A September 2026 study published in PLOS Climate, involving 790 US adults, examined how people used ChatGPT to evaluate four false climate claims.
The researchers found that positive language and semantic richness in ChatGPT’s responses were associated with higher perceived credibility of the responses. Participants’ existing acceptance of climate science, attention to climate change and familiarity with ChatGPT also influenced their credibility judgments.
The findings do not establish that persuasive language makes people believe misinformation. They do, however, highlight how the presentation of an AI response can shape users’ perceptions of its credibility — an important consideration when chatbots are used to assess misleading climate claims.
A separate study, published in Public Understanding of Science identified another form of bias. Comparing GPT-family model responses with expert assessments based on the IPCC’s 2023 Synthesis Report, the researchers found that the models systematically overestimated climate change impacts. The tendency was more pronounced when models were prompted to respond in the role of climate scientists.
Language gaps and possible safeguards
UNESCO’s report also found that climate information generated by AI is not equally reliable across languages. Average accuracy was 88.6% in English, compared with 83.6% in Hindi and Bengali, 81.4% in Urdu and 78.3% in Swahili. Across five models, fewer than half of the questions in two climate datasets received the same answer in all 13 tested languages.
A single false assertion from a “climate scientist” lowered accuracy significantly in 13 of the 15 models; sustained pushback did so in all 15 under every identity.Image credit:UNESCO
The researchers link these differences partly to the quality and quantity of digital text available for model training in different languages. The findings raise concerns for communities that depend on languages in which AI systems have been less extensively trained.
Research also points to ways of improving AI-assisted climate fact-checking. A 2025 study in npj Climate Action introduced Climinator, a system that combines large language models with authoritative sources, including IPCC and World Meteorological Organization material, to assess climate claims. At one level of detailed claim classification, it achieved an F1 score of 72.7%, compared with 58.5% for GPT-4o. Another study, published in Climatic Change in September 2026, found that structured prompts and retrieval of authoritative external sources improved some aspects of AI-generated climate debunking.
These approaches do not eliminate the need for verification, but suggest that models can be made more useful when their responses are grounded in scientific evidence rather than generated from their internal knowledge alone.
UNESCO recommends stronger disclosure of model performance across languages and under user pressure, alongside independent evaluation before deployment in public-interest settings. It also calls on educators, journalists and civil society groups to verify AI-generated claims against reliable sources.
The central warning is not that AI has no place in climate communication. It is that the ability to explain climate science convincingly should not be mistaken for the ability to evaluate evidence, resist misinformation or independently guide climate policy.
India Records 436 Extreme Weather Events in 30 Years, Loss of 170 billion USD
India recorded 436 extreme climate events between 1996 and 2025, averaging one event every 25 days. These disasters claimed over 78,000 lives, affected 1.2 billion people and caused more than 170 billion dollars in economic losses.
India has faced a relentless succession of cyclones, floods and deadly heatwaves over the past three decades. Between 1996 and 2025, the country recorded 436 extreme weather events, which together claimed more than 78,000 lives, affected over 1.2 billion people and caused economic losses exceeding 170 billion dollars.Averaged across the 30-year period, that amounts to one extreme weather event every 25 days. The scale of this recurring toll places India 10th among the world’s most climate-affected countries, according to the Climate Risk Index 2027, published by Germanwatch, a Germany-based environmental and development organisation.
The figures capture the cumulative toll of recurring disasters across the country, from destructive cyclones and monsoon floods to prolonged heatwaves. Unlike countries whose long-term rankings were driven largely by one exceptionally devastating catastrophe, India’s position reflects repeated exposure to extreme weather events over several decades. The Philippines and Nicaragua are also included in this group.
Countries such as Dominica, Myanmar and Honduras, meanwhile, rank highly because of exceptionally destructive disasters that accounted for a substantial share of their recorded losses. For India, the pattern is different. Its 436 recorded events represent a succession of climate-related emergencies across different regions and seasons.
India ranks 10th among the countries most affected by extreme weather events between 1996 and 2025.The Germanwatch Climate Risk Index 2027 breaks down the ranking across six indicators covering fatalities, people affected and economic losses.
Three Decades of Cyclones, Floods and Extreme Heat
India’s 10th-place position in the long-term ranking is largely the result of repeated disasters over three decades. Germanwatch describes India as a country facing “continuous threats”, where one extreme weather event follows another and the losses accumulate over time. The events range from the 1998 Gujarat and 1999 Odisha cyclones to Cyclone Hudhud in 2014, Cyclone Amphan in 2020, the Uttarakhand floods of 2013 and severe floods across 13 states in 2019.
The financial toll of individual disasters shows how sharply these losses can rise. Cyclone Amphan alone caused more than 16 billion dollars in damage in India, adjusted for inflation. It was the most destructive cyclone recorded in the country’s 30-year assessment period.
The report also identifies four years — 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2015 — when recurring and unusually intense heatwaves, with temperatures around 50°C, claimed many lives. These episodes sit alongside the deaths and displacement caused by floods and cyclones in the country’s long-term disaster record.
India’s geographical diversity exposes it to several hazards. Its long coastline faces tropical cyclones and storm surges, the Himalayan region experiences intense rainfall, floods and landslides, while large parts of the country depend on the monsoon for agriculture and water availability. Extreme heat affects both rural and urban populations.
The Germanwatch report attributes countries’ high climate risk rankings to heightened exposure to hazards or increased vulnerability. In India’s case, recurring disasters mean that the effects of one event can overlap with the economic and social consequences of earlier ones. A flood can destroy homes, roads, crops and public infrastructure. When another extreme weather event strikes before affected communities have recovered, households and local economies face additional financial pressure. Farmers may lose successive harvests, while damage to roads, electricity networks and water systems can disrupt essential services.
Urban development presents another challenge. Rapid construction and the expansion of built-up areas can reduce the land available to absorb rainwater, increasing the risk of urban flooding. The concentration of buildings, roads and other infrastructure can also intensify heat exposure.
A 2025 World Bank report, Towards Resilient and Prosperous Cities in India, examined climate risks in 24 Indian cities, with particular attention to Chennai, Indore, New Delhi, Lucknow, Surat and Thiruvananthapuram. It found that urban heat island effects can raise temperatures in city centres by 3–4°C compared with surrounding areas. The report also warned that expanding built-up areas are reducing cities’ capacity to absorb stormwater.
The scale of future urban development makes these risks particularly significant. India’s urban population is projected to increase from 480 million in 2020 to 951 million by 2050. More than half of the infrastructure required for that future urban population is yet to be built. Decisions about housing, transport, drainage and public spaces will therefore influence how well cities withstand future climate shocks.
Economic vulnerability compounds these geographical pressures. The World Bank has noted that more than 80% of India’s population lives in districts at risk of climate-induced disasters. Communities dependent on agriculture, fishing and outdoor work can face significant livelihood disruptions when extreme weather affects their primary sources of income.
Climate Resilience Must Become Part of Development Planning
The scale of India’s recorded losses makes climate resilience an important component of economic and social planning. It involves preparing communities and institutions for extreme weather, reducing their exposure to hazards and ensuring that essential services can continue during and after disasters.
Early warning systems are an important part of this effort. Forecasts need to reach people in time and communicate the likely impact of an event, allowing local authorities and communities to act before a disaster occurs. Evacuation arrangements, accessible shelters, trained emergency personnel and reliable communication networks can reduce casualties and disruption.
India’s experience with heat preparedness in Ahmedabad offers an example. Following a deadly heatwave in 2010 that caused 1,334 additional deaths in May alone, the city introduced South Asia’s first comprehensive Heat Action Plan in 2013. The programme combines temperature-based warnings with public communication, healthcare preparedness and measures to protect people exposed to extreme heat. A World Bank case study credits the plan with helping avert around 1,100 deaths annually in the years immediately following its introduction.
Flood resilience requires a different set of interventions. Cities need drainage systems designed around local rainfall patterns, better stormwater management and restrictions on construction in vulnerable floodplains. Wetlands, lakes and open spaces can also help retain excess rainwater. The World Bank’s 2025 urban resilience report recommends combining engineered infrastructure, such as drains and flood embankments, with nature-based measures that improve water absorption and storage.
Infrastructure outside cities also needs attention. Roads, bridges, electricity networks, hospitals and water supply systems must be designed to withstand the hazards prevalent in their locations. In agricultural regions, better access to weather information, water conservation, resilient farming practices and financial protection against crop losses can help households recover from extreme weather.
Community preparedness is equally important. Local authorities need to identify vulnerable households, understand the risks faced by different communities and ensure that disaster warnings translate into practical action. Outdoor workers, older people, children, people with disabilities and low-income households may require specific protection during heatwaves, floods and cyclones.
Climate resilience also requires sustained financial investment. The World Bank’s 2025 assessment estimates that India will need more than $2.4 trillion by 2050 to meet its requirements for resilient, low-carbon urban infrastructure and services. It estimates that timely adaptation measures could avert annual urban flood-related losses of up to $5 billion by 2030 and $30 billion by 2070. Investments in adaptation could also prevent more than 130,000 deaths from extreme heat by 2050.
These estimates underline the economic value of preparing for climate risks before they cause widespread damage. Spending on resilient infrastructure, early warning systems and local adaptation can reduce the costs of repeated reconstruction and emergency relief.
India’s 436 recorded extreme weather events over three decades provide a measure of the pressure that recurring disasters place on its people and economy. Building resilience requires planning for the hazards that different regions face, protecting vulnerable communities and ensuring that development does not create new sources of risk. The decisions taken on infrastructure, land use, public health and livelihoods today will influence how much damage future extreme weather events cause.