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How the Iran–Israel–US Conflict Ripples Through India’s Economy and Energy Future

The immediate reality is uncertainty: higher freight, rising insurance, volatile crude, jittery exporters

Dipin Damodharan

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Oil Iran Israel
Image credit: Alexander Bobrov/Pexels

The tremors began far from India’s shores. US and Israeli strikes on Iran, followed by retaliatory actions, have redrawn fault lines across West Asia. But in New Delhi, in oil refineries along the western coast, and in rice mandis across Haryana and Punjab, the aftershocks are already being felt.

“US and Israel attacks on Iran, and subsequent counter attacks have exposed a new wave of geopolitical risks,” notes a policy briefing from Climate Trends, reviewed by EdPublica. For India — bound to Israel by strategic ties and to Iran by history and geography — the moment is fraught with complexity.

At the heart of the unfolding crisis lies a narrow maritime artery: the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz: India’s Energy Lifeline

Nearly a quarter of the world’s crude oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz — a chokepoint linking West Asian producers to global markets. For South Asia, the dependency is sharper. Around 40% of the total crude oil consumption of India, China, Japan and South Korea transits this passage.

India imports nearly 90% of its crude oil. Of its daily imports, 2.5–2.7 million barrels per day — largely from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE — pass through these contested waters.

Strase von Hormuz
Image credit: Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Land Rapid Response Team, NASA/GSFC/Wikimedia Commons

The risks are no longer theoretical. According to reports, Iran has been relaying warnings over VHF radio to ships, cautioning that passage may not be guaranteed. Insurance pricing for shipping has risen by 50% overnight. Freight rates are climbing. The Director General of Shipping has issued a circular advising stakeholders not to deploy Indian crews in Iran.

If Iran’s 3.3 million barrels per day production is disrupted, oil prices could rise 9–15%, pushing crude from a base of $70 per barrel to roughly $76–81.

For India, the impact would be “more price driven and not volume driven”. Yet price shocks ripple quickly — widening the current account deficit, weakening the rupee and feeding domestic inflation.

Vivek Y. Kelkar, researcher working at the intersection of geo-economics and sustainability, warns: “Much depends on how long the conflict endures and whether risks to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz persist… For India, the impact would be indirect but significant. With nearly 90 percent import dependence, every $10 per barrel rise increases the annual import bill by about $13–14 billion, widening the current account deficit, pressuring the rupee and adding to inflation.”

He adds that China — which buys roughly 90% of Iran’s crude exports — could pivot more aggressively toward Russian, Iraqi, Saudi and West African grades if Iranian volumes shrink. “If Beijing pivots toward the same Russian or Atlantic Basin supplies that India relies on for diversification, India’s energy security could become more expensive and more contested. The likely outcome is not deep scarcity, but tighter global balances, higher prices and diminished negotiating leverage for Indian refiners.”

From Oil Tanks to Rice Fields

The consequences extend well beyond petrol pumps.

In the weeks before the conflict escalated, Iranian importers had placed large orders for basmati rice, pushing local prices up by about ₹10 per kg. Iran accounts for roughly 25% of India’s basmati exports; Iraq another 20%. Together, that’s over 2 million tonnes valued at more than $2 billion annually.

Uncertainty now looms over these trade flows. Tea exports too may take a hit — nearly ₹7 billion worth was exported to Iran in 2024–25.

More broadly, Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE account for bilateral trade worth about $117.32 billion, with the UAE alone contributing nearly $100 billion. Any regional escalation directly threatens these ties.

The UAE Factor: A Stable Hub Under Strain

Dubai has long been viewed as West Asia’s insulated commercial gateway — a financial and logistics hub even when politics elsewhere burned. But the conflict “fundamentally alters Dubai’s longstanding reputation as a politically insulated financial and trade hub”. India and the UAE have been expanding cooperation in renewables, green hydrogen and critical minerals. The India–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2022, marked India’s first such accord in the MENA region. Escalation now risks slowing joint ventures and technology exchanges just as clean transition investments were gathering pace.

“India’s policy of strategic autonomy has so far helped it navigate the choppy waters of geopolitics but the balancing act has become increasingly tough. The conflict in west Asia and its repercussions raise the risks to its supply chains, test energy security and increase insurance costs and fuel inflation if energy prices remain elevated, as is expected if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked… Yet, despite the rising risks India’s economy and markets are relatively better placed to ride this geopolitical storm,” Archana Chaudhary, Associate Director at Climate Trends, notes.

A Clean Energy Imperative, Not Just a Climate Goal

The crisis may also sharpen India’s clean energy calculus. Elevated oil costs increase dollar demand, typically putting downward pressure on the rupee. Costlier fuel filters into transportation, logistics and eventually food prices. Renewable energy supply chains — including critical minerals — could also be disrupted, as significant shipping traffic flows through Hormuz

Yet analysts see opportunity in the turbulence. “The recent strikes only reinforce the validity of India’s long-standing principle of strategic autonomy. In an increasingly volatile West Asian landscape, the wisdom of accelerating our clean energy ambitions becomes even more apparent for energy security. Reducing dependence on imported conventional energy sources, i.e. oil and gas, through rapid deployment of clean technologies is no longer just a climate imperative but a strategic necessity… In this fractured geopolitical order, India must deepen the momentum toward clean energy transition and technological self-reliance to insulate its growth trajectory from external shocks,” Aarti Khosla, Director, Climate Trends, argues.

Vaibhav Chaturvedi, Senior Fellow at CEEW, echoes the urgency: “The US-Iran war doesn’t bode well for the global energy economy. In the short run, we can expect an increase in oil prices. In the medium term, if the war drags, there would be a negative impact on the global economy. The event will undoubtedly create headwinds for India’s economy. India will do well to leverage its relationships to access cheaper oil in this scenario. This is a moment to bring investments to ramp up plans to scale up electrification of the power and transport sector faster as the ultimate solution to energy security.”

Duttatreya Das, Energy Analyst–Asia at Ember, calls this a turning point: “The past few months have been challenging for India’s crude supplies—first the shift away from discounted Russian Urals to avoid U.S. tariffs, and now the potential volume impact from disruptions in West Asia. While these disruptions may be short-term, India cannot simply afford to remain hostage to geopolitical volatility… Moments like these offer an opportunity to recalibrate its mobility policy, through electrification and a faster expansion of ethanol blending in the near term.”

A Moment of Strategic Testing

In South Block, a Cabinet meeting chaired by the Prime Minister signals the seriousness of the moment. OPEC has indicated it may adjust production to maintain market stability. India’s long-held doctrine of strategic autonomy — balancing relationships across rival blocs — is now under stress. After US pressure restricted purchases of Russian oil, India diversified more toward Gulf suppliers, inadvertently deepening its exposure to Hormuz-linked risks. Though it imports from over 40 countries, geography and geopolitics cannot be entirely diversified away.

The immediate reality is uncertainty: higher freight, rising insurance, volatile crude, jittery exporters.

The longer-term question is whether this crisis accelerates a structural pivot. In the shadows of tankers and warships, India’s energy transition debate is no longer abstract. It is entangled with inflation, trade, currency stability and food security.

Dipin Damodharan is an award-winning journalist, editor and media entrepreneur, and Co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of EdPublica, an independent global media platform covering education, science, research, innovation, climate and public policy. With more than a decade of experience in journalism, he has worked across print, digital and multimedia media. His reporting explores science, climate, sustainability and the social impact of research and innovation. His work has been recognised by the Solutions Journalism Network and other journalism organisations.

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Is India paying more than it thinks for chemical farming?

India’s fertiliser subsidy system carries fiscal, environmental and energy costs beyond the price farmers pay. A new Climate Trends study examines the case for balanced nutrient use, organic alternatives and a gradual transition to low-input farming.

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A farmer carrying a backpack sprayer while working in a paddy field.
A farmer sprays agricultural chemicals in a paddy field, illustrating the use of external inputs in rice cultivation. Representational image. Image credit: masudar rahman/ Pexels

For a paddy farmer in Kuttanad, the amount of fertiliser needed is different from that recommended for other parts of Kerala. The Kerala Agricultural University recommends 90 kg of nitrogen, 45 kg of phosphorus and 15 kg of potassium per hectare for medium-duration, high-yielding rice varieties in Kuttanad. However, this recommendation applies only under certain conditions. The soil should have medium to high potassium levels, rice straw should be mixed back into the soil, and tidal water should supply some nutrients to the field. If soil tests show low potassium levels, the fertiliser requirement changes.

This is because fertiliser needs depend on several factors, including soil type, water movement, rice variety and how crop residues are managed. If farmers apply more fertiliser than their crops need, cultivation costs can rise. The unused nutrients may also enter nearby water bodies and cause pollution. Fertiliser prices in India are heavily subsidised by the government. In 2024–25, the Centre spent 1.77 lakh crore rupees on fertiliser subsidies. This support keeps fertilisers affordable for farmers, but the cost to the public is rarely included when calculating how profitable farming really is.

A study by Climate Trends, titled The Economics of Cultivation, looks at what happens wchen these government subsidies and the environmental costs of fertiliser use are included in the economics of farming. The study suggests that the actual returns from farming that relies heavily on chemical fertilisers may be considerably lower than they appear when these costs are left out.

What does a Hectare of Wheat Really Earn?

Farmers calculate their profit by private net returns, the money a farmer has left after paying for production. But there is another way called the social net return. This includes the government’s spending on fertiliser subsidies and the greenhouse gas emissions produced during fertiliser manufacturing and use. These costs do not appear in a farmer’s accounts, but are borne by taxpayers and the environment.

Across five wheat cultivation cases examined in the study, the social return was estimated to be 36% to 182% lower than the private return, with an average difference of around 90%. In two cases, the return turned negative after these additional costs were included. Punjab’s wheat cultivation in 2019–20 shows how large this gap can be. The study estimates that farmers earned a net return of 31,901 rupees per hectare after deducting cultivation expenses. However, when an additional 11,554 rupees per hectare in fertiliser subsidy costs and greenhouse gas emissions was accounted for, the return fell to 20,347 rupees per hectare.

The study also estimates that Punjab’s fertiliser-related fiscal cost in 2022–23 was 14,072 rupees per hectare. This was nearly four times the all-India figure of 3,630 rupees per hectare in 2021–22. While the farmers continue to benefit from subsidised fertiliser prices, which reduce their cultivation expenses, the additional costs that are shifted to taxpayers and the environment.

Fertiliser subsidy
India’s chemical fertiliser nutrient use rose from 0.2 million tonnes in 1960–61 to 30.64 million tonnes in 2023–24, reflecting the country’s growing dependence on synthetic fertilisers. Source: Climate Trends

Pricing Policy Influencing Nutrient Choices

India’s fertiliser subsidy policy also influences nutrient use. Introduced in 2010, the Nutrient Based Subsidy (NBS) scheme links subsidies for phosphatic and potassic fertilisers to their nutrient content, while companies have greater freedom to set prices. Urea, which supplies nitrogen, remains under government price control.

This makes urea relatively cheaper and may encourage farmers to use more nitrogen-based fertiliser, even when crops need a different nutrient balance. As the study suggests nitrogen’s share of fertiliser consumption reached 69.9% in 2012–13. Its statistical analysis recorded a 4.42 percentage-point annual increase in the post-2010 trend. However, the analysis covers only four years after the reform and has no control group. It therefore cannot establish that the policy alone caused the increase.

The Indian Council of Agricultural Research recommends soil-test-based fertiliser application rather than a uniform nutrient ratio. Kerala’s lower nitrogen share does not necessarily mean fertiliser use is efficient across all its farms. In Kuttanad, for example, the recommended potassium dose depends on existing soil levels and whether rice straw is incorporated into the field.

Emissions and the Cost of Imported Inputs

Producing synthetic nitrogen fertilisers requires large amounts of energy, much of it from fossil fuels. Their use also releases nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas that traps much more heat than carbon dioxide over 100 years. Climate Trends report finds the global synthetic nitrogen fertiliser supply chain produced an estimated 1.13 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in 2018, accounting for about 2.1% of global greenhouse gas emissions. In India, fertiliser manufacturing alone produced an estimated 25 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in 2022–23.

India also depends heavily on imports for fertiliser production. It imports potash, several raw materials used in phosphate fertilisers, natural gas and ammonia. Disruptions to international trade routes and energy supplies can therefore affect both the cost and availability of these inputs. The disruption around the Strait of Hormuz is an example.

When international prices rise, the government may have to spend more to keep fertilisers affordable. Farmers, meanwhile, can face supply shortages and uncertainty over availability, even when retail prices are regulated.
“We need to fundamentally rethink our approach to soil conservation, moving beyond engineering structures and short-term interventions towards the revival of ecosystems. Despite decades of investment, soil erosion continues to intensify, while the productivity of prime agricultural lands and ecosystems is declining.

Restoring soil health, conserving natural resources and strengthening ecological processes must be at the heart of our response. This also calls for promoting diversified cropping practices suited to local agroecological conditions, rather than perpetuating resource-intensive cropping patterns. Building climate-resilient agriculture requires us to address the root causes of soil degradation, strengthen local ecological solutions and restore the natural systems that help communities withstand droughts, floods and other climate stresses.”, said Dr. Basant Kumar Kandpal, Technical Expert (Agriculture and Horticulture), National Rainfed Area
Authority (NRAA).

Can Farmers Move Away From Chemical Inputs?

For Kerala’s rice farmers, fertiliser requirements vary across fields. In Kuttanad, for instance, the recommended potassium dose depends on soil-test results and whether rice straw is returned to the field. Applying these recommendations requires accessible soil testing, regular agricultural extension support and affordable inputs.

“Excessive dependence on chemical fertilisers comes at a far greater cost to the nation than what is reflected in their market prices or subsidy allocations. Soil degradation, environmental damage, energy dependence and the growing fiscal burden are increasingly difficult to ignore. However, the transition to organic and natural farming cannot be left entirely to farmers. It requires sustained government support, investment in research and extension services, affordable alternatives and assured market linkages.”, said Dr Palak Balyan, Lead Author and Research Lead, Climate Trends.

The study calls for changes to fertiliser pricing and subsidy distribution. Its recommendations include pricing urea according to nutrient content, linking part of the subsidy to Soil Health Card advice and supporting farmers who shift to low-input cultivation. It estimates that transitioning one million hectares of transplanted rice to low-input farming could save Rs 1,155 crore annually.

The experiences of Andhra Pradesh and Sikkim show why the transition needs careful planning. Andhra Pradesh’s natural farming programme recorded more than twice the profits at broadly similar yields, while Sikkim faced yield losses amid inadequate farmer training and limited access to certified organic markets.

The challenge, therefore, is to reduce excessive fertiliser use without increasing farmers’ costs or putting yields at risk. The study argues for redirecting public support towards balanced nutrient use, farmer training and affordable alternatives, while accounting for the fiscal, energy and environmental costs of fertiliser-intensive agriculture.

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Nearly 72% of Migrant Workers in South India Report Improved Living Standards, but Labour Protection Remains Weak

India’s migrant construction workers play a crucial role in the country’s urban development, yet many continue to face poor working conditions, inadequate social security, wage insecurity and limited access to essential services.

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Construction workers wearing safety helmets and carrying electrical cables at an unfinished building construction site in India.
Construction workers at an ongoing building project. Migrant labourers form a significant part of India's construction workforce.Image credit:Pexels

Nearly 72 per cent of interstate migrant workers surveyed across Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu reported improved living standards after moving to the southern states. However, access to welfare benefits, healthcare and formal employment protections remains a major challenge, according to a new regional survey.

The findings are part of the South India Interstate Migration Survey (SIIMS) 2026, published by the International Institute of Migration and Development (IIMAD) in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Based on a mixed-methods study of 1,824 migrant workers across 33 districts, the survey examines migration patterns, employment conditions, housing, healthcare, financial security and access to social protection. Data were collected between December 15, 2025, and March 31, 2026. The research covered agriculture, fisheries and daily-wage labour across the three states, alongside hospitality in Kerala, scrap collection in Karnataka and textile and garment work in Tamil Nadu.

The survey found that 71.8 per cent of respondents reported improved living standards after migration, while 56.9 per cent intended to continue working in their destination states. However, the findings also reveal a gap between improved livelihood opportunities and access to basic labour protections.

Employment insecurity and gaps in social protection

The absence of formal employment arrangements emerged as one of the major concerns. Around 86.4 per cent of surveyed workers did not have written employment contracts, while 57.6 per cent received their wages in cash. Only 12.8 per cent reported awareness of their labour rights or available support programmes.

The lack of written contracts can make it difficult for workers to establish employment terms, seek compensation for unpaid wages or pursue grievances. The survey also found that 15.6 per cent of respondents had experienced a workplace accident during the preceding year, while only one per cent had accident insurance.

Access to welfare benefits was similarly limited. Only 19.4 per cent of respondents reported easy access to welfare benefits after migration, while 45.3 per cent faced considerable difficulties. Another 35.3 per cent reported partial access. Healthcare access presented another concern, with 69.2 per cent reporting difficulties obtaining healthcare services.

These findings are supported by a separate study published in Frontiers in Human Dynamics on July 14, 2026. Researchers examined employment precarity and psychosocial well-being among 428 interstate migrant workers in Kerala.

The study, titled Employment Precarity and Psychosocial Well-being among Interstate Migrant Workers in India: The Mediating Role of Social Protection, found a significant association between insecure employment and lower psychosocial well-being. Social protection had a statistically significant indirect effect in this relationship, suggesting that institutional support could partly mitigate the disadvantages associated with precarious employment.

migrant workers
south india

Women migrant workers working in a grass field. Image credit:Pexels

The researchers noted that the relationship between employment insecurity and well-being remained significant even after examining factors such as social exclusion and individual coping mechanisms. However, because the study used a cross-sectional design, the findings establish associations rather than causation.

The financial inclusion findings also reveal a gap between access to banking and broader economic security. Although 88.2 per cent of surveyed workers had access to formal financial services, this did not necessarily translate into access to welfare benefits, insurance or secure employment.

Gender differences further shaped workers’ economic experiences. Women migrant workers earned approximately Rs 3,313 less per month than men, even after researchers accounted for other measured factors. The findings indicate that employment vulnerabilities are not distributed equally across the migrant workforce.

Migration governance requires coordination between states

The survey identified circular migration as an important feature of interstate labour mobility, with 82 per cent of respondents classified as circular migrants. Many workers move repeatedly between their home states and employment destinations, often relying on informal networks of friends and relatives to find work.

This movement creates challenges for welfare systems that remain organised around state-specific administrative structures. Workers may find it difficult to access benefits when their employment, residence and documentation are spread across different locations.

The report recommends stronger coordination between origin and destination states, improved portability of welfare benefits, multilingual assistance and more accessible healthcare services. It also calls for better labour inspections and stronger workplace protections, particularly in sectors where informal employment is widespread.

The findings raise questions about whether existing social protection mechanisms are adequately responding to the mobility of India’s workforce. While migration provides employment opportunities and improves living standards for many workers, the absence of reliable employment safeguards and accessible welfare services leaves significant gaps in their protection.

As southern states continue to depend on interstate labour across construction, agriculture, hospitality, manufacturing and other sectors, ensuring that workers can access their rights and benefits wherever they move will remain an important challenge for migration policy.

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Sikkim Records 79% Growth in Milk Production Over a Decade, Dairy Cooperatives Expand

Sikkim has recorded a 79% increase in milk production over the past decade. New initiatives include a Siri cattle Centre of Excellence, dairy infrastructure upgrades and Churpi traceability.

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Dairy cows feeding at a cattle farm, illustrating livestock production and dairy development in Sikkim.
Dairy cattle at a livestock farm. Sikkim has recorded a 79% increase in milk production over the past decade, alongside an 88% expansion in dairy cooperative societies. Representational image. Image credit: Los Muertos Crew/ Pexels

Sikkim’s daily milk production has increased by 79% over the past decade, rising from 1.37 lakh litres to 2.45 lakh litres, according to the Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying. The state has also recorded an 88% increase in dairy cooperative societies during the same period, reflecting the expansion of its organised dairy network.

Union Minister for Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying Rajiv Ranjan Singh highlighted the figures at a programme organised by the Sikkim Milk Union in Gangtok on November 3, 2026. The growth comes against the backdrop of India’s expanding dairy industry. India produced 247.87 million tonnes of milk in 2024–25, retaining its position as the world’s largest milk producer. Its output increased by 3.58% from 239.30 million tonnes in 2023–24, accounting for approximately a quarter of global milk production.

Uttar Pradesh is the country’s largest milk-producing state, contributing 15.66% of national output in 2024–25. Rajasthan followed with 14.82%, while Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra accounted for 9.12%, 7.78% and 6.71%, respectively. These five states together contributed approximately 54% of India’s milk production.

Union Minister Rajiv Ranjan Singh and Sikkim officials jointly hold a certificate at a Sikkim Milk Union event in Gangtok.
Union Minister Rajiv Ranjan Singh attends the Sikkim Milk Union programme in Gangtok, where initiatives to strengthen the state’s dairy cooperative network and infrastructure were announced.

India’s dairy industry primarily serves its large domestic market, with milk and milk products consumed across rural and urban households. Uttar Pradesh, besides being the largest producer, is also a major consumption market. Government data for 2023–24 put its monthly per capita milk consumption at 5.69 litres in rural areas and 8 litres in urban areas.

However, production volumes do not automatically translate into organised market supply. Uttar Pradesh’s Dairy Development Department estimates that only around 10% of the state’s marketable milk surplus is processed through the organised sector, compared with a national average of approximately 17%. This points to gaps in processing and marketing infrastructure despite the state’s substantial production.

Expansion of Sikkim’s Dairy Network

In Sikkim, the number of dairy cooperative societies increased from 389 in 2014–15 to 733 in 2025–26. Daily milk supply to consumers also doubled, from 28,000 litres to 56,000 litres.

The programme included several initiatives aimed at improving dairy infrastructure, milk quality and the commercial value of traditional dairy products. The minister inaugurated a microbiology laboratory of the Sikkim Milk Union under the National Programme for Dairy Development (NPDD). The facility is intended to strengthen microbiological testing and quality assessment, supporting food safety in the dairy sector.

A Churpi traceability initiative was also launched to strengthen the identity and marketability of the traditional dairy product. In addition, Fodder Plus products developed by Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs) were introduced to improve fodder availability and create additional income opportunities in the livestock sector. Five newly established dairy cooperative societies received registration certificates during the programme.

Siri Cattle Conservation and Dairy Infrastructure

The minister also announced plans to establish a Centre of Excellence for the conservation and development of indigenous Siri cattle. The proposal follows his visit to Mangan, where local cattle were reported to produce an average of approximately three litres of milk per day.

The proposed centre will focus on improving the breed’s genetic potential and milk productivity through advanced breeding technologies, including in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). The minister said the Central Government would sanction funds for the initiative and invited the Sikkim Government to submit a formal proposal. The National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) will also finance and undertake the comprehensive modernisation of the existing dairy processing plant in Mangan district, drawing on the model implemented in Mizoram.

Highlighting the potential of organised dairy development, Singh cited NDDB’s intervention in Varanasi, where milk collection reportedly increased from 14,000 litres per day in 2022 to approximately 2.5 lakh litres. The price received by farmers rose from ₹28–30 to ₹42 per litre. The initiative also created additional income opportunities through the utilisation of cow dung in biogas plants under the GOBARdhan programme. The minister called on NDDB to strengthen its support and deploy additional human resources in Sikkim to help the state achieve self-reliance in milk production and procurement.

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