When the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted in 2026, a return to coal seemed inevitable. Instead, renewable energy filled the gap—revealing a deeper shift in how the world responds to energy crises.

When the Strait of Hormuz was blocked in early 2026, the world braced for an energy crisis. The narrow waterway is one of the most critical routes for global fuel transport, carrying nearly 19% of the world’s liquefied natural gas. As shipments were disrupted, a familiar expectation took hold: countries would fall back on coal.

That assumption was rooted in history. In previous crises, when gas supplies became uncertain or expensive, coal often filled the gap. This time, many expected the same pattern to repeat.

But it didn’t.

According to an analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), global fossil fuel power generation fell by around 1% in March 2026 compared to the previous year. Gas-fired power dropped more sharply, by 4%, while coal generation remained largely flat.

Hormuz Crisis and Clean Energy Shift

The CREA analysis, which draws on near-real-time electricity data covering major power markets including China, the United States, the European Union, and India, represents around 87% of global coal power and over 60% of gas power. In the context of a global disruption, even a modest decline signals something more structural: the expected “return to coal” did not materialise.

The explanation lies in a shift that has been building quietly over the past decade—the rapid expansion of renewable energy.

In March 2026, increases in solar and wind played a decisive role in offsetting the drop in fossil fuels. Solar generation rose by 14%, while wind increased by 8%, with hydropower also contributing modest gains. Together, these sources absorbed the shortfall without pushing systems back toward coal.

“The record growth in global clean power generation, particularly solar and wind, has helped ease the impact of the latest fossil fuel crisis,” said Lauri Myllyvirta, Lead Analyst at CREA. “The increase in clean electricity offset the fall in gas-fired power generation following the Hormuz blockade, preventing a jump in coal-fired power generation.”

Outside China, coal-fired generation fell by 3.5%, while gas declined by 4%. Major economies—including the United States, India, the European Union, Turkey, and South Africa—recorded reductions in coal-based electricity. This directly challenges the long-standing assumption that fossil fuels serve as the default backup during crises.

The scale of renewable growth helps explain why.

In 2025 alone, the world added roughly 510 gigawatts of solar capacity and 160 gigawatts of wind. These additions are expected to generate about 1,100 terawatt-hours of electricity annually. By comparison, all the natural gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025 could produce around 590 terawatt-hours—roughly equivalent to France’s total power generation.

In effect, the renewable capacity added in a single year now produces nearly twice the electricity linked to one of the world’s most strategic fossil fuel routes. The implications are structural, not temporary.

Further evidence comes from coal transport. Seaborne coal shipments fell by 3% in March 2026, reaching their lowest levels since 2021. China and India, the world’s largest coal importers, saw a 9% drop in shipments, while countries such as Turkey and Vietnam also recorded declines.

Coal did not step in to fill the gap, in part because it could not. In many markets, coal plants were already operating near their maximum capacity. With coal already heavily utilised—often because it had been cheaper than gas—there was limited room to increase output further.

Gas, by contrast, typically serves as a flexible buffer in power systems. When gas supplies were disrupted, that flexibility was constrained. Renewable energy, rather than coal, filled the resulting gap.

At the same time, rising fossil fuel prices have strengthened the economic case for clean energy, discouraging new investment in coal.

This pattern has precedent. When Russia reduced gas exports to Europe, there were similar fears of a coal resurgence. While coal use rose briefly, the longer-term response was an acceleration of renewable deployment, leading to a sustained decline in emissions. The Hormuz disruption appears to be reinforcing that trajectory rather than reversing it.

At the country level, the trend is largely consistent. The most significant declines in coal power generation were recorded in the United States, India, South Africa, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands. In many cases, the expansion of solar power was the primary driver, supported by improvements in hydropower and nuclear generation.

There were exceptions. Japan and South Korea saw increases in coal use due to weaker nuclear output, while parts of coastal China temporarily shifted from gas to coal amid high gas prices. Even so, overall coal generation in China remained below 2024 levels, underscoring the broader direction of change.

The crisis has also triggered policy responses aligned with long-term transition goals. France is accelerating electrification across key sectors. Egypt plans to add 2,500 megawatts of renewable capacity. India has announced annual bids for 50 gigawatts of renewable energy. Indonesia is pursuing a 100-gigawatt solar vision, while Turkey has pledged $80 billion in renewable investments by 2035. Vietnam, meanwhile, is planning to phase out coal-fired plants in new energy projects after 2030.

These moves suggest that the response to disruption is not a return to older systems, but a faster shift toward new ones. The findings from CREA point to a deeper transition already underway—one in which clean energy is no longer supplementary, but central to energy security.

For decades, fossil fuels were seen as the backbone of energy security—reliable, scalable, and indispensable during crises. That assumption is now being tested. Renewable energy is increasingly demonstrating its ability to stabilise supply during periods of disruption.

The idea of a “coal comeback” may have made for compelling headlines, but the data tells a different story. Instead of turning back, the global energy system appears to be moving forward.

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately be remembered not as a moment of regression, but as an inflection point—one that revealed how far the transition to clean energy has already progressed, and how it may accelerate in the years ahead.

India’s non-fossil power capacity is set to reach 70% by 2035-36, driven by rapid solar expansion, but grid constraints, storage gaps and utilisation challenges could shape the energy transition.

India is preparing for one of the most dramatic transformations in its energy sector, with the Central Electricity Authority outlining a future where clean energy dominates installed capacity but fossil fuels continue to underpin supply reliability.

The National Generation Adequacy Plan (2026-27 to 2035-36) presents the most detailed roadmap yet of how India’s electricity system will evolve over the next decade. It projects that India’s installed power capacity will reach 1,121 GW by 2035-36, with 70% (786 GW) coming from non-fossil sources, signalling a structural shift in the country’s energy mix.

At the same time, the report highlights a more complex reality: capacity expansion alone will not define the transition—utilisation, storage, and grid readiness will.

India Power Capacity 2035-36 to Cross 1,100 GW

India’s electricity system is expected to nearly double in scale over the next decade.

According to the report, net electricity generation is projected to rise from around 1,725 billion units today to 3,450 billion units by 2035-36, reflecting the country’s rapid economic growth and electrification push.

Solar energy is set to emerge as the dominant force in India’s power mix. Installed solar capacity alone is expected to exceed 500 GW, accounting for nearly 45% of total capacity, making it the single largest contributor to India’s energy basket.

The detailed breakdown of projected capacity includes:

• 315 GW coal
• 509 GW solar
• 155 GW wind
• 78 GW large hydro
• 20 GW gas
• 22 GW nuclear

These figures underline a system where renewables dominate capacity, but conventional sources remain critical to stability.

India Power Capacity 2035-36 vs Actual Generation Gap

One of the most important insights from the report is the divergence between installed capacity and actual electricity generation.

Despite renewables making up 70% of capacity, coal is expected to remain the backbone of electricity supply. The report projects coal will still account for 51% of total electricity generation (1,819 BU), while solar will contribute around 27% (984 BU).

This gap reflects the intermittent nature of renewable energy and the continued need for firm, dispatchable power.

As the report notes, “the source of firm power at present is predominantly coal-based generation.”

This highlights a key transition challenge: while India can rapidly build renewable capacity, replacing coal’s role in ensuring round-the-clock supply will require deeper systemic changes.

India Power Capacity 2035-36 Faces Grid Bottlenecks

While India’s renewable expansion has been rapid, the system’s ability to absorb this capacity remains constrained.

A major concern flagged in the analysis is the issue of stranded renewable capacity—power that is generated but cannot be transmitted due to grid limitations.

Vibhuti Garg, Director South Asia at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, said: “It is encouraging to see the national generation adequacy plan taking shape. India has made remarkable progress in expanding renewable energy capacity, with clean sources now accounting for more than 50% of installed capacity.

However, the real test lies not in capacity addition, but in how effectively this generation is utilised. Currently, over 37 GW of renewable energy capacity remains stranded—highlighting gaps in planning, integration, and grid readiness.

This underscores the urgent need to shift focus from merely adding capacity to ensuring efficient evacuation and utilisation. Strengthening transmission infrastructure and aligning it with demand centres is critical. As supply and demand increasingly diverge geographically, coordinated planning becomes essential.”

The report also notes that renewable energy generation is becoming more geographically dispersed, increasing the need for robust transmission networks to connect generation hubs with consumption centres.

India Power Capacity 2035-36 Needs Massive Storage Push

Energy storage emerges as the single most critical enabler of India’s clean energy transition.

The plan estimates that India will require 174 GW / 888 GWh of energy storage capacity by 2035-36, including battery storage and pumped hydro.

However, the current pipeline is far from sufficient:

• Only 10.6 GW of battery storage is under construction
• Additional capacity remains in tendering or early planning stages

This gap between projected need and current deployment highlights a major financing and policy challenge.

The report also emphasises that solar-plus-storage systems are emerging as an alternative, particularly for meeting peak demand during non-solar hours, but are yet to fully replace coal-based baseload generation.

India Power Capacity 2035-36 and Energy Security

The timing of the plan is significant, coming amid global energy market disruptions and geopolitical tensions.

Vibhuti Garg noted:“At a time when India remains exposed to global fuel supply disruptions due to geopolitical tensions, accelerating renewable energy integration is not just a climate imperative—it is an economic and energy security necessity.”

The report positions renewable energy not just as a climate solution, but as a strategic tool for reducing dependence on imported fuels.

EVs and Data Centres as New Demand Drivers

The plan also identifies electric vehicles and data centres as emerging sources of electricity demand.

These loads are expected to be geographically concentrated, requiring careful coordination between energy supply and demand planning.

Vibhuti Garg added: “This challenge will intensify with the rise of new demand drivers such as electric vehicles and data centres. These loads are often geographically concentrated, making it even more important to strategically plan clean energy supply in tandem with demand clusters.”

India’s power sector is entering a defining decade.

The National Generation Adequacy Plan makes it clear that the country is on track to build one of the world’s largest clean energy systems. But it also underscores that capacity alone is not enough.

The real transition will depend on:

• Grid infrastructure
• Energy storage deployment
• Demand-side planning
• Policy alignment with emerging technologies

As the report emphasises, the goal is not just to expand capacity, but to ensure a reliable, resilient, and cost-effective power system capable of meeting India’s rapidly growing electricity demand.

Iran–Israel–US conflict impact on India could raise crude prices, disrupt trade, widen the current account deficit, and pressure energy security.

The tremors began far from India’s shores. US and Israeli strikes on Iran, followed by retaliatory actions, have redrawn fault lines across West Asia. But in New Delhi, in oil refineries along the western coast, and in rice mandis across Haryana and Punjab, the aftershocks are already being felt.

“US and Israel attacks on Iran, and subsequent counter attacks have exposed a new wave of geopolitical risks,” notes a policy briefing from Climate Trends, reviewed by EdPublica. For India — bound to Israel by strategic ties and to Iran by history and geography — the moment is fraught with complexity.

At the heart of the unfolding crisis lies a narrow maritime artery: the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz: India’s Energy Lifeline

Nearly a quarter of the world’s crude oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz — a chokepoint linking West Asian producers to global markets. For South Asia, the dependency is sharper. Around 40% of the total crude oil consumption of India, China, Japan and South Korea transits this passage.

India imports nearly 90% of its crude oil. Of its daily imports, 2.5–2.7 million barrels per day — largely from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE — pass through these contested waters.

The risks are no longer theoretical. According to reports, Iran has been relaying warnings over VHF radio to ships, cautioning that passage may not be guaranteed. Insurance pricing for shipping has risen by 50% overnight. Freight rates are climbing. The Director General of Shipping has issued a circular advising stakeholders not to deploy Indian crews in Iran.

If Iran’s 3.3 million barrels per day production is disrupted, oil prices could rise 9–15%, pushing crude from a base of $70 per barrel to roughly $76–81.

For India, the impact would be “more price driven and not volume driven”. Yet price shocks ripple quickly — widening the current account deficit, weakening the rupee and feeding domestic inflation.

The Iran–Israel–US conflict impact on India is unfolding most sharply through energy markets. With nearly 90% of its crude oil imported and a significant share transiting the Strait of Hormuz, even a modest rise in global oil prices can widen the current account deficit, pressure the rupee, and fuel domestic inflation. The risk is less about immediate shortages and more about sustained price volatility that filters into transport, logistics and food costs.

Vivek Y. Kelkar, researcher working at the intersection of geo-economics and sustainability, warns: “Much depends on how long the conflict endures and whether risks to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz persist… For India, the impact would be indirect but significant. With nearly 90 percent import dependence, every $10 per barrel rise increases the annual import bill by about $13–14 billion, widening the current account deficit, pressuring the rupee and adding to inflation.”

He adds that China — which buys roughly 90% of Iran’s crude exports — could pivot more aggressively toward Russian, Iraqi, Saudi and West African grades if Iranian volumes shrink. “If Beijing pivots toward the same Russian or Atlantic Basin supplies that India relies on for diversification, India’s energy security could become more expensive and more contested. The likely outcome is not deep scarcity, but tighter global balances, higher prices and diminished negotiating leverage for Indian refiners.”

From Oil Tanks to Rice Fields

The consequences extend well beyond petrol pumps.

In the weeks before the conflict escalated, Iranian importers had placed large orders for basmati rice, pushing local prices up by about Rs 10 per kg. Iran accounts for roughly 25% of India’s basmati exports; Iraq another 20%. Together, that’s over 2 million tonnes valued at more than $2 billion annually.

Beyond oil, the Iran–Israel–US conflict impact on India extends to trade and exports. Iran and Iraq together account for a substantial share of India’s basmati rice exports, while tea shipments and broader West Asian trade flows face uncertainty amid rising insurance premiums and shipping disruptions. Any prolonged instability could compress margins for exporters and complicate payment mechanisms across the region.

Uncertainty now looms over these trade flows. Tea exports too may take a hit — nearly Rs 7 billion worth was exported to Iran in 2024–25.

More broadly, Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE account for bilateral trade worth about $117.32 billion, with the UAE alone contributing nearly $100 billion. Any regional escalation directly threatens these ties.

The UAE Factor: A Stable Hub Under Strain

Dubai has long been viewed as West Asia’s insulated commercial gateway — a financial and logistics hub even when politics elsewhere burned. But the conflict “fundamentally alters Dubai’s longstanding reputation as a politically insulated financial and trade hub”. India and the UAE have been expanding cooperation in renewables, green hydrogen and critical minerals. The India–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2022, marked India’s first such accord in the MENA region. Escalation now risks slowing joint ventures and technology exchanges just as clean transition investments were gathering pace.

“India’s policy of strategic autonomy has so far helped it navigate the choppy waters of geopolitics but the balancing act has become increasingly tough. The conflict in west Asia and its repercussions raise the risks to its supply chains, test energy security and increase insurance costs and fuel inflation if energy prices remain elevated, as is expected if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked… Yet, despite the rising risks India’s economy and markets are relatively better placed to ride this geopolitical storm,” Archana Chaudhary, Associate Director at Climate Trends, notes.

A Clean Energy Imperative, Not Just a Climate Goal

The crisis may also sharpen India’s clean energy calculus. Elevated oil costs increase dollar demand, typically putting downward pressure on the rupee. Costlier fuel filters into transportation, logistics and eventually food prices. Renewable energy supply chains — including critical minerals — could also be disrupted, as significant shipping traffic flows through Hormuz

Yet analysts see opportunity in the turbulence. “The recent strikes only reinforce the validity of India’s long-standing principle of strategic autonomy. In an increasingly volatile West Asian landscape, the wisdom of accelerating our clean energy ambitions becomes even more apparent for energy security. Reducing dependence on imported conventional energy sources, i.e. oil and gas, through rapid deployment of clean technologies is no longer just a climate imperative but a strategic necessity… In this fractured geopolitical order, India must deepen the momentum toward clean energy transition and technological self-reliance to insulate its growth trajectory from external shocks,” Aarti Khosla, Director, Climate Trends, argues.

Vaibhav Chaturvedi, Senior Fellow at CEEW, echoes the urgency: “The US-Iran war doesn’t bode well for the global energy economy. In the short run, we can expect an increase in oil prices. In the medium term, if the war drags, there would be a negative impact on the global economy. The event will undoubtedly create headwinds for India’s economy. India will do well to leverage its relationships to access cheaper oil in this scenario. This is a moment to bring investments to ramp up plans to scale up electrification of the power and transport sector faster as the ultimate solution to energy security.”

Strategically, the Iran–Israel–US conflict impact on India reinforces the urgency of diversifying energy sources and accelerating clean transition goals. As geopolitical tensions expose the vulnerabilities of fossil fuel dependence, electrification, renewable expansion and domestic energy resilience are no longer only climate priorities — they are economic safeguards against recurring global shocks.

Duttatreya Das, Energy Analyst–Asia at Ember, calls this a turning point: “The past few months have been challenging for India’s crude supplies—first the shift away from discounted Russian Urals to avoid U.S. tariffs, and now the potential volume impact from disruptions in West Asia. While these disruptions may be short-term, India cannot simply afford to remain hostage to geopolitical volatility… Moments like these offer an opportunity to recalibrate its mobility policy, through electrification and a faster expansion of ethanol blending in the near term.”

A Moment of Strategic Testing

In South Block, a Cabinet meeting chaired by the Prime Minister signals the seriousness of the moment. OPEC has indicated it may adjust production to maintain market stability. India’s long-held doctrine of strategic autonomy — balancing relationships across rival blocs — is now under stress. After US pressure restricted purchases of Russian oil, India diversified more toward Gulf suppliers, inadvertently deepening its exposure to Hormuz-linked risks. Though it imports from over 40 countries, geography and geopolitics cannot be entirely diversified away.

The immediate reality is uncertainty: higher freight, rising insurance, volatile crude, jittery exporters.

The longer-term question is whether this crisis accelerates a structural pivot. In the shadows of tankers and warships, India’s energy transition debate is no longer abstract. It is entangled with inflation, trade, currency stability and food security.

As oil flows through a narrow strait watched by rival navies, India’s policymakers face a widening strategic horizon — where climate ambition, economic resilience and geopolitical balancing are no longer separate conversations, but one.