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How China Is Redrawing the Global Map of Critical Minerals

China’s $120bn critical minerals investment is reshaping global supply chains and strengthening its dominance in the clean energy economy.

Dipin Damodharan

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China’s $120 billion investment surge into critical minerals is not just about securing resources—it is about shaping the architecture of the global clean energy economy
Image credit: Thắng-Nhật Trần

China’s $120 billion investment surge into critical minerals is not just about securing resources—it is about shaping the architecture of the global clean energy economy. As supply chains realign, the balance of industrial power is shifting in ways that could define the next century

The global energy transition is often framed as a technological race—who will build the best batteries, the most efficient solar panels, or the most advanced electric vehicles. But beneath this narrative lies a more fundamental contest: control over the raw materials that make these technologies possible.

Lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earths—these are not just commodities. They are the building blocks of the new industrial economy.

Over the past few years, China has moved decisively to secure them.

A recent analysis by Climate Energy Finance (CEF) estimates that China has committed more than $120 billion in outbound investment into critical minerals and metals since 2023, spanning multiple continents and resource categories.

What this report documents is not merely investment flows, but the architecture of a new global green industrial order,” says Tim Buckley, report lead author and Director at CEF.

This is not a scattered set of deals. It is a coordinated strategy—one that is rapidly reshaping the global resource landscape.

Beyond Extraction: Building a System

Historically, global resource investment followed a familiar pattern: capital flowed from developed economies into resource-rich regions, extracting raw materials for export with limited local value creation.

China’s current approach marks a significant departure.

Instead of focusing solely on extraction, Chinese firms are increasingly investing in processing, infrastructure, and industrial ecosystems within host countries—building ports, railways, clean energy systems, and enabling manufacturing capacity.

As Associate Professor of the Australia–China Relations Institute at the University of Technology, Marina Yue Zhang notes, the strategy has moved “well beyond simple resource extraction towards a more integrated model linking resource acquisition with processing, infrastructure, manufacturing, and long-term industrial partnerships.”

The result is a vertically integrated system that connects resource acquisition, refining, and industrial production into a single coordinated framework.

China already dominates many parts of this chain—accounting for roughly 90% of global rare earth refining, over 70% of cobalt processing, and around 60% of lithium processing.

The Logic of Vertical Integration

At the heart of China’s strategy is a simple economic insight: control the entire value chain, and you control the market.

By investing simultaneously in mines, processing facilities, and downstream manufacturing, China reduces its dependence on external suppliers while increasing global reliance on its capabilities.

Buckley underscores the scale and intent of this approach: China has built “a vertically integrated green supply chain spanning every continent, combining state-directed capital with private enterprise execution at a speed and scale no competitor country comes close to matching.”

For competitors, replicating this model is not just a matter of capital—it requires alignment between policy, industry, and long-term planning.

A New Partnership Model in the Global South

One of the most significant shifts in China’s strategy is how it engages with resource-rich nations.

Earlier models of foreign investment were often criticised as extractive. Today, Chinese firms are increasingly offering in-country processing, infrastructure investment, skilled employment, and technology transfer in exchange for long-term resource access.

As CEF analyst Matt Pollard explains, these are “not just mining deals, but blueprints for green industrialisation,” offering pathways for emerging economies to build domestic industries.

For many countries in the Global South, this represents a significant opportunity—but also a strategic choice.

A Multipolar Shift

China’s resource strategy is unfolding in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

As Western economies adopt more protectionist measures and retreat from multilateral engagement, China has expanded its global investment footprint—particularly across emerging markets.

Buckley argues that this divergence is accelerating China’s momentum: its trajectory is “one of adaptation and acceleration, not retreat,” even amid rising geopolitical tensions.

The result is a shift toward a more multipolar global economy, where influence is distributed across multiple centres rather than concentrated in traditional Western powers.

Supply Chain Risks and Strategic Vulnerabilities

China’s growing dominance also raises concerns.

The concentration of extraction and processing capacity creates risks for global supply chains, energy security, and industrial competitiveness.

Countries dependent on these supply chains face potential vulnerabilities—from geopolitical disruptions to market imbalances.

Efforts to diversify supply are emerging, including strategic collaborations such as Japan’s partnership with Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths to secure long-term supply.

But scaling such alternatives remains a complex and time-intensive challenge.

The Limits of Protectionism

In response to China’s rise, some governments have turned to tariffs, trade barriers, and restrictive policies.

While these measures may offer short-term protection, they do little to address the underlying structural gap.

The challenge is not simply one of market access—it is one of capability.

Without investment in processing, infrastructure, and industrial capacity, alternative supply chains remain incomplete. Protectionism, in this context, risks isolating economies rather than strengthening them.

More effective responses are likely to involve strategic partnerships and targeted investments, similar to emerging collaborations in rare earth supply chains.

Implications for India and Emerging Economies

For countries like India, the evolving resource landscape presents both opportunity and urgency.

India has ambitions to become a major player in clean energy manufacturing and supply chain diversification. It has a large domestic market, growing industrial capacity, and a strong talent base.

But it faces significant gaps.

Processing capabilities remain limited. Access to critical minerals is constrained. And integration across the value chain is still developing.

To compete effectively, India will need to move beyond isolated initiatives and adopt a more coordinated approach—linking resource access, industrial policy, and global partnerships.

More broadly, resource-rich nations face a strategic choice. They can remain suppliers of raw materials, or they can leverage current demand to build domestic industries and capture greater value.

China’s model offers one pathway. Whether others can develop alternatives will shape the future of the global economy.

The New Resource Order

The transition to a low-carbon economy is not just an environmental imperative—it is an industrial transformation.

At its core lies a simple reality: technologies may evolve, but they are built on physical resources. Control those resources, and you shape the trajectory of the transition.

China’s $120 billion investment surge is a reflection of this understanding. It is not merely securing supply—it is constructing a system.

The implications are profound.

As the world moves toward net zero, the question is no longer just who will innovate, but who will control the inputs that make innovation possible.

In that contest, the contours of a new resource order are already emerging—and China is at its centre.

Dipin Damodharan is the Co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of EdPublica. A journalist and editor with over 15 years of experience leading and co-founding both print and digital media outlets, he has written extensively on education, politics, and culture. His work has appeared in global publications such as The Huffington Post, The Himalayan Times, DailyO, Education Insider, and others.

Climate

World Bank Drops 45% Climate Finance Target Under US Pressure

World Bank climate finance target has been dropped following US pressure, raising concerns over climate adaptation funding and support for vulnerable countries.

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World Bank climate finance target withdrawn amid pressure from the United States.
Image credit/Rosemary Ketchum/Pexels

World Bank climate finance target has been abandoned following pressure from the United States, prompting warnings that vulnerable countries could face reduced funding for climate adaptation and resilience.

The World Bank has abandoned its flagship pledge to direct 45% of annual lending toward climate-related activities, a retreat from a commitment it made at COP28 and one that campaigners say will hit the world’s most vulnerable countries hardest.

The decision followed sustained pressure from the United States, the Bank’s largest shareholder, and came despite last-minute appeals from France — the institution’s fifth-largest shareholder — to keep the target in place. The Bank says it will continue reporting on the climate finance it provides, but it is no longer bound to hit the 45% threshold.

Why the World Bank Climate Finance Target Was Dropped

The World Bank has long been the single largest source of climate finance for developing countries. Multilateral development banks collectively delivered a record $137 billion in climate finance in 2024, with the World Bank contributing the biggest share. That funding underpins the Baku-to-Belém roadmap, which assigns development banks a central role in reaching the $1.3 trillion climate finance goal agreed at COP29.

Dropping the target now, critics argue, sends the wrong signal at the wrong moment. Eleonora Cogo, Climate Finance Lead at the ECCO think tank, put it bluntly:

“The World Bank says it is following its clients’ lead, but the data says otherwise: developing countries want solar, wind and hydropower. Scrapping climate targets at the very moment they are being surpassed, under pressure that runs directly counter to what recipient countries are asking for, is not neutrality. It is a choice that leaves the most vulnerable even more exposed to climate impacts and to the fossil fuel market instability that every new global energy crisis brings back into the spotlight.”

One Plan Survives, Another Falls

Amid the fallout, the Bank did extend its Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) — the framework aligning its operations with the Paris Agreement — just before its June 30 expiry. The plan had itself been under threat from Washington, and its survival came only after what one observer called a bruising fight among shareholders.

Jon Sward of the Bretton Woods Project described the outcome as a mixed result: “After a long and difficult negotiation among World Bank shareholders, the Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan has survived, but despite the efforts of other board members, US pressure has weakened the Bank’s climate work with the retirement of the 45% climate finance target.”

He added that the Bank still owes clarity on how a forthcoming independent review will shape the CCAP’s future — and how civil society groups, largely excluded from the negotiations, will be brought back in.

World Bank Climate Finance Target Scrapped Under US Pressure
Image credit/Rosemary Ketchum/Pexels

Joe Thwaites of the Natural Resources Defense Council struck a more defiant note, stressing that the Bank’s underlying obligations haven’t disappeared: “Let’s be clear: the World Bank still has a mandate to continue providing climate finance. The Climate Change Action Plan has been extended. Losing the overarching 45% climate finance target is bad, but individual World Bank Group entities still have their own climate targets, which can be a backstop against the bottom falling out.”

He called on shareholders to hold Bank leadership accountable and suggested donors redirect support to other institutions if World Bank climate finance begins to slide.

The Real Damage: Adaptation, Not Mitigation

Several analysts warned that the target’s disappearance won’t necessarily starve clean-energy projects — those are increasingly commercially viable on their own. The bigger casualty, they say, will be adaptation and resilience finance, which has always depended more heavily on concessional, subsidized capital.

Labanya Prakash Jena, Director of the Climate and Sustainability Initiative in India, explained:”There will be a limited impact on capital flows to bankable renewables/mitigation projects, since these are commercially attractive. The real risk is to climate adaptation and resilience financing — urban heat resilience, flood defences, climate-vulnerable agriculture — which relied on subsidised capital and development assistance, precisely because it’s harder to make commercially attractive.”

Jena noted that India, as the World Bank Group’s largest borrower, has diversified funding sources that will cushion the blow to mitigation projects — but adaptation finance will still take a disproportionate hit.

Suranjali Tandon, Associate Professor at NIPFP, connected the decision to a broader geopolitical shift: “Dropping the climate finance target reflects the shifting priorities globally. Not surprisingly, among the representatives that declined to endorse the continued work on climate change are large fossil fuel producers. Abandoning the target means the flow of finance, which so far used a broader co-benefits approach, may decline especially where the outcomes in climate change projects become less immediately discernible.”

A Push for Alternatives

For some, the episode is less a crisis than a call to action. Dhruba Purkayastha, Senior Advisor for Climate and Environment at Dalberg, framed the World Bank’s messaging with skepticism — while pointing toward a possible workaround: “While the removal of climate finance target is being positioned as shifting from ‘inputs to outcomes,’ it surely further erodes the concept of climate action as global public good, and weakens global sustainable development multilateralism. Therefore, there is need to step up on regional green development banks, funds, financial institutions such as maybe an Asia Green Finance Institution or a suprasovereign Asian Green Fund.”

What Happens Next

The World Bank’s decision arrives just months after the G11 group of developing nations formally urged the institution to extend its climate plan — a request partially honored, even as the numerical target that once anchored the Bank’s climate ambitions disappears. With the CCAP’s extension length still unannounced and an independent review pending, the coming months will determine whether individual entity-level targets and voluntary reporting can hold the line — or whether, as campaigners fear, climate finance quietly starts to shrink just as the world needs it most.

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Space & Physics

From Assembly to Silicon: India’s Long Road to Semiconductor Self-Reliance

India is building a semiconductor ecosystem through fabrication, packaging, chip design and Mission 2.0 to reduce imports and strengthen technology leadership.

Joe Jacob

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What India Semiconductor Mission 2.0 Changes
Image credit; Miguel Á. Padriñán/Pexels

For decades, India excelled at writing the software that powered the world’s computers but remained almost entirely dependent on other countries for the chips inside them. Every smartphone, fighter aircraft, satellite, electric vehicle, telecom network and artificial intelligence system relied on semiconductors designed and manufactured largely outside India’s borders.

That dependence has become one of the country’s biggest strategic vulnerabilities.

Today, India is attempting to change that.

How the India Semiconductor Mission Began

What began as an industrial policy is steadily evolving into a national technology mission—one that seeks not merely to manufacture chips, but to build an ecosystem spanning design, fabrication, advanced packaging, materials, equipment and skilled talent. If successful, it could reshape India’s manufacturing landscape and strengthen its position in a global technology race increasingly defined by semiconductor capabilities.

The launch of the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) marked a turning point. Rather than offering isolated incentives, the government adopted a mission-driven approach aimed at creating an end-to-end semiconductor ecosystem. The objective extends beyond attracting investment; it is about ensuring technological sovereignty in a world where access to chips increasingly determines economic resilience and national security.

The Design Linked Incentive (DLI) scheme has been an important catalyst. We are seeing some early success. At the same time, there is also an evolutionary factor at play. Engineers who moved abroad 20–25 years ago are now at a stage where they have both the experience and financial capacity to take entrepreneurial risks. Many also want to return to India–says Neelkanth Mishra, in an interview with EdPublica.

Why semiconductors matter

Semiconductors are often described as the “brains” of modern electronics, but their strategic significance runs far deeper.

Every sector that governments now classify as critical—artificial intelligence, defence, space, telecommunications, medical devices, automobiles, renewable energy and industrial automation—depends on increasingly sophisticated chips.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed how vulnerable global supply chains had become. Factory shutdowns in one part of the world disrupted automobile production thousands of kilometres away. Geopolitical tensions further highlighted the risks of concentrating semiconductor manufacturing in only a handful of countries.

For India, which imports billions of dollars’ worth of electronic components every year, the lesson was unmistakable: technological ambition cannot rest entirely on imported hardware.

Building the foundation

Recognising this challenge, the government launched India Semiconductor Mission 1.0, backed by a financial incentive programme worth ₹76,000 crore. It represented India’s first coordinated attempt to build semiconductor manufacturing capabilities within the country.

The mission was designed to support multiple segments simultaneously:

>> silicon wafer fabrication plants;

>> assembly, testing, marking and packaging (ATMP) facilities;

>> Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) units;

>> compound semiconductor manufacturing;

>> semiconductor design through the Design Linked Incentive (DLI) Scheme.

Rather than relying on a single mega-project, policymakers attempted to create an ecosystem in which manufacturing, design, packaging and supply chains could evolve together.

From policy announcements to factories

One of the biggest criticisms of India’s earlier electronics programmes was that announcements often outpaced execution.

This time, the picture is beginning to look different.

Approved semiconductor projects now represent cumulative investment commitments exceeding ₹1.64 lakh crore, spread across multiple states. According to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the approved portfolio now covers fabrication facilities, packaging plants and compound semiconductor manufacturing, reflecting a broader industrial base than initially envisioned.

The most visible milestone has been the commencement of commercial production at Micron Technology’s advanced semiconductor packaging facility in Gujarat, widely regarded as the first major operational success under the mission.

Several other large projects—including those led by Tata Electronics, Kaynes Semicon, and the Tata-PSMC semiconductor fabrication project at Dholera—have moved into advanced stages of construction and are expected to enter commercial production soon. Together, they represent India’s first serious attempt to establish domestic silicon manufacturing at scale.

Equally significant is the geographical spread.

Instead of concentrating semiconductor manufacturing in one industrial cluster, projects are now emerging across Gujarat, Rajasthan and other states, creating the beginnings of a distributed semiconductor manufacturing network.

Manufacturing is only one piece of the puzzle

Building chips requires far more than fabrication plants.

A modern semiconductor ecosystem depends on hundreds of specialised suppliers producing chemicals, gases, ultra-pure materials, precision equipment, packaging technologies and printed circuit boards (PCBs).

Recognising these gaps, the government has started extending policy support beyond chip fabrication.

A recent example is the foundation of advanced PCB manufacturing projects worth about ₹6,750 crore in Jewar, Uttar Pradesh. These facilities are expected to manufacture high-density multilayer PCBs—including advanced 20-22 layer boards—that India has traditionally imported in large quantities.

India Semiconductor Mission chip manufacturing facility
Image credit/Pok Rie / Pexels

Reducing imports of such critical components strengthens the broader electronics manufacturing ecosystem while creating domestic capabilities that extend well beyond semiconductor fabrication itself.

Design remains India’s strongest advantage

While fabrication receives most public attention, India already possesses one major strength: semiconductor design.

Thousands of engineers employed by global companies already design chips from Indian engineering centres. The challenge has been converting this design talent into domestic intellectual property.

The Design Linked Incentive (DLI) Scheme attempts to bridge that gap.

According to government data, the programme has supported dozens of chip design projects, enabled successful tape-outs, encouraged patent filings and provided advanced chip-design tools to more than 100 companies while training a growing pool of specialised semiconductor engineers.

Moving from outsourced engineering services towards Indian-owned semiconductor intellectual property could prove just as significant as establishing fabrication plants.

The next chapter: ISM 2.0

If the first phase focused on attracting semiconductor manufacturing, the next phase aims to deepen India’s role across the entire value chain.

Announced in the Union Budget 2026-27, India Semiconductor Mission 2.0 shifts attention towards areas where India still depends heavily on imports.

The new phase proposes support for:

>> semiconductor manufacturing equipment;

>> specialty materials and chemicals;

>> indigenous semiconductor intellectual property;

>> advanced packaging technologies;

>> compound semiconductors;

>> industry-led research and training centres.

The underlying philosophy is straightforward: long-term self-reliance cannot be achieved by importing all the machinery, chemicals and specialised materials required to manufacture chips.

Instead, India aims to build capabilities throughout the production chain—from research laboratories to finished semiconductor products.

Recent reports indicate that the government is also preparing a substantially larger financial commitment for ISM 2.0 as it expands beyond manufacturing incentives into ecosystem development.

Strategic partnerships without strategic dependence

India’s semiconductor strategy has deliberately combined domestic capability building with international collaboration.

Leading companies from the United States, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have become partners in India’s emerging semiconductor ecosystem, bringing technology, manufacturing expertise and investment.

This reflects a broader policy shift.

Rather than attempting complete technological isolation, India is seeking trusted international partnerships while gradually strengthening indigenous capabilities in manufacturing, design and supply chains.

In an increasingly fragmented global technology landscape, diversification itself has become a strategic asset.

The road ahead remains difficult

Despite visible progress, India’s semiconductor journey is still in its early stages.

Chip fabrication demands extraordinary precision, massive capital investments, reliable infrastructure and uninterrupted supplies of ultra-pure water, electricity and specialised materials. Success also depends on building a workforce capable of operating some of the world’s most sophisticated manufacturing facilities.

Moreover, semiconductor manufacturing is measured in decades, not election cycles.

Countries that dominate the industry today invested consistently over many years before becoming global leaders.

India therefore faces the challenge of maintaining policy continuity while ensuring that announced projects translate into commercially competitive production.

A larger national ambition

The significance of India’s semiconductor mission extends well beyond electronics manufacturing.

Every fabrication facility commissioned, every packaging unit established and every design company supported reduces import dependence, creates highly skilled employment and strengthens India’s position within global technology supply chains.

For a country seeking greater strategic autonomy, semiconductor capability is increasingly becoming as important as energy security or defence preparedness.

The first phase of the mission has established the initial building blocks. The second phase aims to strengthen the ecosystem beneath them.

Whether India ultimately becomes a major global semiconductor hub will depend not on a single factory or policy announcement, but on its ability to sustain investment, develop talent, encourage innovation and build an integrated value chain over the coming decade.

After years of watching the global semiconductor revolution from the sidelines, India has entered the race. The challenge now is to ensure that today’s investment commitments become tomorrow’s manufacturing capability—and eventually, technological leadership.

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Society

CBSE Revaluation Raises Questions Over KCET Rank Revisions

KCET rank revision comes under scrutiny after CBSE students’ revised Class 12 marks failed to reflect in the merit list despite official revaluation.

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KCET Rank revisions
A representative image of a student under academic stress amid uncertainty over examination results and admissions. Image credit: Laskhmiprasad S/iStock

As Karnataka’s engineering admissions enter the counselling phase, questions over the KCET rank revision process have emerged after a CBSE student’s Class 12 marks were officially revised following the board’s revaluation. With the KCET option entry window closing on Monday, Bengaluru-based aspirant Sounak Nag says his rank continues to reflect his pre-revaluation CBSE marks despite being issued a revised marksheet by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), raising concerns that the delay could cost him a college seat.

Nag told EdPublica that he is not alone and that several other students whose marks were revised after revaluation are facing similar uncertainty. Since KCET ranks are calculated using a combination of entrance examination scores and Class 12 marks, revisions in board scores can alter a candidate’s position in the merit list and affect the colleges and courses for which they are eligible.

From Corrected Marks to Uncertainty in KCET Rank Revisions

Nag said his Class 12 marks increased after CBSE completed its official revaluation process. Based on the revised scores, he expected KEA to update his KCET rank. However, despite receiving the revised marksheet, the published rank list remained unchanged.

With the counselling process underway, he fears that the delay in reflecting his revised marks could affect his admission prospects.

CBSE’s 2026 Valuation Controversy

After CBSE’s official revaluation, Nag said he received higher marks in all five subjects. His case comes against the backdrop of concerns surrounding CBSE’s 2026 digital On-Screen Marking (OSM) system.

Following the declaration of the Class 12 results, students across the country reported discrepancies in evaluation, including allegations of missing answers, blank scanned pages and incorrect marking. The complaints prompted many candidates to apply for verification and revaluation of their answer scripts.

KCET Rank revisions
Students check examination-related information online. (Representative image) Image credit: Deepak Sethi/iStock

In several cases, the revaluation process resulted in revised marks, raising questions over the accuracy of the initial evaluation. While CBSE maintained that its evaluation process was robust overall, it acknowledged certain discrepancies and issued revised marksheets through its official revaluation mechanism. For students appearing for entrance examinations that factor in board marks, these revisions have created a fresh challenge when admission processes are already underway.

No Clarity on Rank Revision, Student Alleges

According to Nag, repeated attempts to contact the Karnataka Examinations Authority (KEA) through its helpline numbers and official email addresses yielded no response. He later visited the KEA office in Malleswaram, where officials asked him to submit a written representation along with photocopies of his original and revised CBSE marksheets.

Nag said he complied with the request but was not given any written acknowledgement, and his KCET rank remained unchanged. As the option entry deadline approached, he visited the KEA office again seeking an update on his request. However, he said there was no clarity on whether his revised marks would be considered before counselling.

“I’ve submitted everything they asked for, but I still don’t know whether my revised marks will be reflected in my rank before counselling begins,” he told EdPublica.

The uncertainty comes amid an admissions cycle that has already witnessed multiple schedule changes in Karnataka. KEA postponed KCET counselling after the Higher Education Department delayed submitting the final seat matrix, with option entry eventually opening on June 20 and the process for NEET-qualified candidates beginning on June 22. Separately, the Consortium of Medical, Engineering and Dental Colleges of Karnataka (COMEDK) extended its counselling registration deadline to June 12, while document verification is continuing until the end of June, pushing subsequent rounds of seat allotment into July. Against this backdrop, students whose board marks are officially revised after revaluation face added uncertainty, as delays in updating entrance ranks during the counselling process could directly affect their admission prospects.

Beyond One Student

Nag’s case raises a broader question about how admission authorities handle revised board examination marks once entrance rank lists have been published. While examination boards such as CBSE provide mechanisms to correct evaluation errors through verification and revaluation, students say there is little clarity on whether, and how quickly, those revisions are reflected in ongoing admission processes.

The issue also comes amid continued scrutiny of India’s examination system. In recent years, evaluation discrepancies, technical glitches, delayed results and irregularities in competitive examinations have exposed gaps in grievance redressal mechanisms. Nag’s experience adds another dimension to that debate: whether admission authorities have adequate procedures to ensure that officially revised academic records are reflected before counselling and seat allotment are completed.

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